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ABSTRACT

The Missouri Science and Technology Satellite (M-SAT) design team on the
campus of the Missouri University of Science and Technology has developed a pair of
satellites to perform an autonomous formation flight mission. To enable the mission, a
unique cold gas propulsion system was developed which utilizes the refrigerant R-134a
as propellant. This thesis details the design process and considerations which led to the
propulsion system as integrated into the satellite for the Flight Competition Review of the
NS4 competition. The design process described flowed from the mission requirements
and program restrictions down through component-level requirements and resulted in a
system capable of performing the assigned duties. The hazard analysis conducted for this
thesis also expanded on previous analyses to address key issues and AFRL concerns.
The analysis showed the system to be safe for personnel and equipment as designed.
Finally, a propulsion test platform was developed to address the few remaining physical
and theoretical performance questions remaining.
While future propulsion systems developed at Missouri S&T may face vastly
different design and mission requirements, the example set forth by the NS4 system and
described herein can serve as a starting point for such endeavors.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The role satellites play in society today cannot be exaggerated as they directly
impact every aspect of life, from the morning commute to evening entertainment. Such
an all pervasive technology must continually adapt and improve to meet the ever
expanding needs of the parent society while expending fewer resources. To meet the
changing demands of the space industry, a paradigm shift in satellite design and operation
is necessary. Under current design practices, satellites are large, complex systems which
take a great deal of resources to launch and operate while lacking crucial flexibility in
mission objectives. Small satellites offer an alternative approach to satellite operations
with increased mission flexibility and smaller resource expenditure being the main
attraction.
The vision that many people hold for the future sees constellations of small
satellites, large and small, working together to accomplish the same goals of their much
larger predecessors. Within the constellation, common tasks would be distributed among
the individual satellites thus allowing the platform to have redundancy and simplicity.
Also, such a design allows the entire constellation to be retasked merely by exchanging a
few of the satellites rather than having to develop and launch and entirely new satellite.
However, to fully realize the advantages offered by small satellites, enabling technologies
such as micro-propulsion systems considered in this study must first be developed.
1.1. CLASSIFICATION OF SATELLITES
There are many objective standards by which to classify satellites: mission, cost,
orbit type, size, etc. Of these, the classification based on size, i.e. wet mass of the
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satellite system upon launch, is perhaps the most useful since it has a direct correlation to
launch costs associated with the project. In general, the moniker of “small satellite” is
given to payloads having mass less than 500 kilograms.

The commonly adopted

classification system, including small satellite subsets, can be found in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1: Satellite Classification System [1]
Category
Mass range (kg)
Large Satellite
>1,000
Medium-Sized Satellite
500-1,000
Small Satellite
<500
Minisatellite
100-500
Microsatellite
10-100
Nanosatellite
1-10
Picosatellite
0.1-1
Femtosatellite
<0.1

Small satellite programs are also often characterized by smaller operational
budgets and quicker development times. This fact makes small satellite development
feasible for university level programs as well as for technology demonstration platforms.
1.2. UNIVERSITY NANOSAT PROGRAM
The University Nanosat Program (UNP) is a joint endeavor between the Air Force
Research Laboratories Space Vehicle Directorate (AFRL/RV), the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) with the stated purpose of encouraging and training the next
generation of aerospace engineers. Participating universities design, develop, and build a
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proto-flight satellite with a mission that is of interest to the Department of Defense
(DOD). The program is set up in a competition format between participating universities
vying for a free launch through the Space Experiment Review Board (SERB) process.
The competition is a two year cycle consisting of multiple design reviews by
AFRL and Industry professionals. The course of the competition is as follows [2]:
Proposal Phase – The cycle begins with the proposal phase, in which interested
universities submit documents detailing the university’s objectives and capabilities.
These documents are reviewed by AFRL personnel and a small number (~10) of
universities are accepted into the program.
System Concept Review (SCR) – SCR comes early within the two year program
and is meant as a chance for each university to convey to UNP officials the mission
objectives, design concepts, program feasibility, and expected schedule of their project.
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) – PDR is a review of the university’s initial
design with special attention paid to the implementation of all safety guidelines. Also at
this time, AFRL representatives ensure teams have implemented proper program
management and system engineering practices.
Critical Design Review (CDR) – CDR occurs at the end of the first year when
university designs should be between 90% and 95% complete. This review is the last
chance for AFRL representatives to assess the design for maturity, inherent risk, and
compliance with program requirements before universities move in earnest into the build
phase of the competition.
Proto-Qualification Review (PQR) – PQR occurs during the second year of the
competition, and focuses on the universities implementation of their design.
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Flight Competition Review (FCR) – FCR is the final review during the
competition process. Universities must deliver a proto-flight satellite to the competition
along with supporting documentation.
In addition to these design reviews, the UNP also provides guidance and training
through a series of documents and workshops. Each team is given access to the UNP
User’s Guide which gives a detailed overview of the program milestones and design
requirements that must be implemented in each university’s spacecraft. Following the
guidelines within the user’s guide ensures each university spacecraft meets strict range
safety criteria and will be able to survive launch. Three workshops are held during the
competition; SHOT I, SHOT II, and a Satellite Fabrication Course. During both Shot I
and Shot II, students from each university build a small device which is flown onboard a
high-altitude weather balloon.

The satellite fabrication class offered students an

opportunity to observe AFRL satellite fabrication techniques as well as receive valuable
information on proper procedure implementation.
1.3. M SAT OVERVIEW AND TEAM HISTORY
The M SAT program is a student design organization on the Missouri University
of Science and Technology (S&T) campus. It began in 2004 with stated purpose of
designing and building a satellite capable of performing technology demonstrations and
furthering space systems knowledge within the community of S&T students.

The

conceptual satellite was to test and compare methods for maintaining Distributed Space
Systems (DSS).
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In January of 2005, the M SAT program (then MR SAT) was accepted into the
UNP Nanosat 4 competition (NS4). Though the course of the NS4 competition, the focus
changed from comparing two methods of maintaining formation flight to a technology
demonstration of autonomous formation flight. The M SAT team placed third out of
eleven entries in the NS4 competition, a notable achievement for a team new to the
program. The team was also named the Most Improved School.
1.3.1. Mission Overview. The main objective of the M-SAT program is the
technological demonstration of close range autonomous formation flight utilizing two
microsatellites; MR SAT (Missouri-Rolla Satellite) and MRS SAT (Missouri-Rolla
Second Satellite). The formation is to be a follower/leader configuration with MR SAT
maintaining a distance of 50 meters ± 5 meters behind MRS SAT.
Achieving this objective requires the implementation of unique solutions to
common satellite challenges.

Inter-satellite communication, Attitude and Orbit

Determination and Control, and indeed Satellite Propulsion all required new approaches
if mission objectives were to be met. Technology demonstrations in these areas will
provide future small satellite projects with more options to meet difficult mission objects
through low-cost solutions.
The mission is organized into different mission modes based on the task required
during that particular phase of the mission. The main divisions within the modes of
operation are Launch, Initialization, Power-Up, Detumble, Pre-Deploy, Separation,
Formation Flight, Range Test, and Extended Mission [3]. Each main mode is further
divided into specific tasks that must be accomplished by the subsystems for the
successful completion of that specific operation. The first five modes of operation occur
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while the satellites are in a docked configuration, as shown in Figure 1.1, while all other
modes occur post-separation (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.1: MR and MRS SAT in Docked Configuration
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Figure 1.2: MR and MRS SAT Post-Separation

1.3.2. Current Status. After the conclusion of the NS4 competition, the team
decided to continue with the construction and testing of the NS4 satellite design. The
project is now entering the “Flat Sat” phase of development in which systems are to be
integrated electronically to determine functionality and compatibility. The primary focus
of this phase involves the C&DH and Power subsystems. As various electronic interfaces
are developed, more of the satellite can be integrated into the Flat Sat until such a time as
all systems are proven to work effectively together.
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Independent of the Flat Sat, subsystems continue testing their components for
functionality and performance. The structural strength of the satellite is currently being
modeled using Finite Element Analysis.
1.4. PROPULSION REQUIREMENTS
Two sources of requirements are placed on the propulsion subsystem: NS4 design
requirements and safety guidelines and M SAT mission requirements. Obviously both
sets of requirements are imperative to the successful implementation of the satellite
project; however, satisfying both sets of requirements is a difficult undertaking for a
single propulsion system.
1.4.1. M SAT Mission Requirements. As stated previously, the main objective
of the M SAT project is the demonstration of close proximity autonomous free formation
flight.

Any formation keeping mission requires a means to overcome the orbit

perturbations inherent in space flight, hence some sort of propulsion system is necessary.
Stemming from this main mission objective produces three system-level requirements:
•

Provide all torques and forces required to maintain attitude and orbit
control.

•

Provide all torques and forces to maintain 50 meter formation flight with
MRS SAT.

•

Provide sufficient performance specifications and propellant mass to
perform one orbit of formation flight.

Implicit within the mission requirements attached to the propulsion subsystem are
other conditions and considerations which must be addressed by any successful design.
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Obviously a system which does not fit within the design envelope of the satellite or is
excessively massive as to render the satellite unresponsive would fail to successfully
accomplish the mission. Indeed, much of the system design, from the number and
placement of thrusters to the necessary tank pressure, stems directly from these three
simple statements.

However, while adhering to these requirements ensures mission

success, it by no means ensures the design of a safe, launchable system. For that, other
requirements and regulations are placed upon the system.
1.4.2. NS4 Propulsion Safety Requirements. Given that the overall objective
of the UNP is to develop flight-worthy spacecraft and guide such spacecraft though the
launch process, safety is a foremost concern.

Strict design criteria, while possibly

inhibiting creative design approaches, ensure that any delivered spacecraft will be able to
successfully navigate the flight approval process with a minimum of design changes.
Different launch ranges and vehicles have unique regulations which must be met before
launch clearance will be granted. In light of this, the only prudent course of action is to
adhere to the most stringent of these standards: i.e. Space Shuttle Secondary Payload
requirements.
For convenience and ease of use, the UNP has summarized the various
requirements into a single limited release document: the NS4 User’s Guide. As part of
the NS4 competition, each team was expected to comply with guidelines and design
requirements set forth in the User’s Guide to ensure the safety and utility of the final
satellite. In regard to a traditional propulsion system, the major requirement concerns the
operation and implantation of a pressurized system. Any pressurized system must meet
the definition of a sealed container as originally stated in NASA-STD-5003 Fracture
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Control Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Shuttle. To meet the standard, the
pressurized system must comply with the pertinent values highlighted in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 Sealed Container Classification Limits [2]
Propellant Property
P – Pressure (Absolute)
U – Internal Energy

Limit
< 689.48 kPa (100 psi)
< 19,319 kJ (14,240 ft-lbs)

On top of the sealed container requirement, the UNP provides a list of practices
and design choices deemed either “discouraged” or “prohibited.” Such practices that
affect a propulsion system are listed below:
•

The use of pyrotechnic devices and/or mechanisms is prohibited

•

The use of toxic and/or volatile fluids or gases is prohibited

•

The use of any material likely to undergo a phase change during launch or
on orbit is discouraged

•

Cast metallic or welded joints are prohibited

•

It is prohibited for universities to manufacture assemblies for which safety
is highly dependent upon the build or assembly process. (Composite
Materials and certain deployment devices for example) If such assemblies
are necessary, these processes must be completed or witnessed by
aerospace professionals.
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While following such guidelines will ensure the safety of the final design, it does
not guarantee that the final design will be capable of meeting mission parameters.
Universities are encouraged to follow User’s Guide requirements wherever possible, and
certain guidelines are non-negotiable; however, if need can be demonstrated a waiver
process can be initiated.
1.5. PURPOSE
This thesis expands upon the knowledge previously acquired by the M SAT
design team in the area of small satellite propulsion. Prior works have focused on the
design and theoretical performance of the system and have laid the foundation for further
development. With this work, the author attempts to discuss the design process and how
the mission requirements and restrictions determine system-level requirements which in
turn directly affect component-level requirements. By highlighting the process which led
to the NS4 propulsion system design, in essence documenting the thoughts and motives
of the design team, this thesis can serve as a guide for future system developments. The
work is further expanded to include a hazard analysis and a system level testing plan to
advance the analysis of the current system and again serve as a guide for future systems.
1.6. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This work is organized into six major sections to facilitate the understanding of
the reader. A brief description of the content within each section is given below:
Literature Review – Following the introductory section, a short literature review
is provided to present the proper context for this work. Within this section, an overview
of small satellite history and development is first discussed with an examination of
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various propulsion methods to follow. Finally, the expected future development of small
satellites and the necessary technological advances are explored in detail.
System Overview – The propulsion system designed for integration into MR
SAT is described in detail with an emphasis on component functionality. The integrated
system and necessary design compromised and choices are explained.
Hazard Analysis – This section describes the possible hazards inherent within
the system and the methods of mitigation implemented in the design of the propulsion
system. It attempts to prove that the system is reasonably safe.
Testing – The testing methods and current results for the system are detailed
within this section. The design and purpose of each system level test is discussed, and
results are presented where applicable.
Conclusions – The final section summarizes the details previously described and
lays the groundwork for future works and tests.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. HISTORY OF SMALL SATELLITES
Over the centuries, space has captured the imagination of layman and expert
alike: its vast expanse a promise of knowledge waiting to be discovered.

As

understanding of the physical realm advanced, so too did the methods and technologies
utilized in scientific exploration. With the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, mankind’s
reach was finally extended beyond the atmosphere into the realm of space. While a
significant achievement, Sputnik did little to further mankind’s understanding of space
containing only radio transmitters and no scientific payload. [4] Explorer I, launched
only four months later by the United States, was a slightly more technically advanced
platform incorporating basic scientific instruments to study the background radiation
environment. [5] This first generation of artificial satellites were all small satellites out
of necessity; however, as rocket performance increased small satellites began to give way
to large, multifunctional platforms.
Throughout the next couple decades, while not entirely disbanded, small satellites
were deemphasized within the space industry. Instead, satellites took advantage of the
greater lifting capacity of modern rockets and ballooned in both size and mass. The
mission tasks assigned to these satellites were thought too complex for their smaller
counterparts and industry officials and scientists did not want to waste precious launches
on inferior payloads.

Satellite programs became massive undertakings with long

development times and billion dollar expenditures.

Failure of these projects was
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devastating to development programs and as a consequence conservative design practices
were implemented.
During this time, small satellites programs were still active both building and
launching spacecraft without much acknowledgement from the wider community. [6]
Several amateur radio satellites were launched including OSCAR (Orbiting Satellite
Carrying Amateur Radio) type satellites which were extremely successful. The first of
these, OSCAR 1, was launched in 1961 and had a mass of a mere five kilograms. [6] By
1983, OSCAR 10 was launched with a wet mass of 90 kilograms. OSCAR 10 employed
the first amateur built satellite propulsion system and many advanced systems including
digital “store and forward” communication. [7] Using this technology, a single, small
satellite in LEO could provide global communication coverage which is beyond the
capabilities of the far larger commercial communication satellites in Geosynchronous
orbit. [6]
With the development of smaller electronics the trend began to reverse and once
again small satellites began to be commonplace. With the advent of the Distributed
Space Systems (DSS) concept, small satellites are now performing missions previously
the domain of large, complex satellites.
2.2. FUTURE OF SMALL SATELLITES
Small satellites hold the promise of a new space concept; however, the
implementation and full advantage of such new methods have not yet been realized.
Currently the moniker small satellite project implies not merely a satellite of significantly
smaller mass, but also smaller projects in terms of budget and complexity. Future small
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satellite projects will strive to keep the associated cost benefits while increasing the
complexity of mission options.
The applications for small satellites appear boundless. As individual satellites the
missions will remain relatively simple yet allow for important scientific knowledge to be
collected. Such was the case with the Chemical Release Observation (CRO) Canister
mission where simple small satellites were used to observe thrusters firings. Each of the
CRO canisters was aerodynamically stabilized along its velocity vector and contained 25
kilograms of hydrazinic chemicals designed to be released under observation from both
the ground and the space shuttle. [6]
The advantages of small satellites become apparent when the distributed space
system concept is employed. One proposed mission calls for a cluster of a 400 identical
small satellites for global communication. All the satellites within the cluster could
remain unguided after insertion into low Earth orbit (LEO) and still maintain 95% global
coverage. Without the need for attitude or orbit control, the base design of the satellite
remains straightforward; thus reducing cost and allowing for mass production.

In

addition to the manufacturing savings, such a cluster has the advantage of redundancy in
that the loss of one or several of the satellites would not significantly reduce the
capabilities of the system [6].
Adding guidance and control to the satellites takes the distributed space system
concept one step farther and allows for even more complex missions to be accomplished.
For instance a constellation of satellites flying in formation could be used to create a
virtual aperture, in effect a very large lens, to use in imagining missions. This virtual
aperture could be more effective than traditional optical systems since it would simulate
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optics of much greater size than could ever be employed. However, for such a system to
work each satellite within the formation must maintain strict relative position tolerances.
2.3. PROPULSION CONSIDERATIONS
Propulsion systems for satellites are chosen by a multitude of factors.

The

primary purpose of the system, be it attitude control or orbit adjustment, must first be
considered as each mission goal places different requirements upon the system. Ideally,
multiple propulsion tasks would be performed using a single propulsion system so as to
reduce satellite complexity, system dry mass, and mission cost. [8] Additional factors
must also be considered such as the necessary response time for maneuvers, the necessary
precision of the system, and the expected mission lifetime.
Maneuver response time is an important consideration. Often times during a
mission slew maneuvers, where the orientation of the satellite is drastically changed,
must be performed within a narrow time window. [8]

A propulsion system designed

merely for attitude control may not possess the brute force capability required to enact
such rapid changes. However, a system capable of rapid maneuvers often times lacks the
small impulse-bit necessary for precise attitude control. In missions that require both,
either a compromise must be made to arrive at the optimal solution or separate systems
must be employed.
Finally, mission time line and life expectancy of the spacecraft must be
considered before any propulsion system is implemented.

Missions requiring vast

amounts of propulsion or long mission life times will require equivalently more
propellant to be stored within the spacecraft. As storing more propellant requires extra
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tank volume and adds mass to the satellite it is important to match system performance
requirements with system efficiency. The specific impulse, ISP, is often used as a means
to objectively gauge the propulsion efficiency of various systems.

Below; Table 2.1

gives the expected Isp values for many types of propulsion systems.

Table 2.1: Expected Isp Ranges for Propulsion Systems [6]
Propulsion System
Expected Isp (s)
Cold Gas
30 – 70
Liquid (bipropellant)
305 – 460
Liquid (monopropellant)
140 – 240
Solid
260 – 300
Hybrid
250 – 350
Electric
300 – 10,000
Nuclear
800 – 6,000

2.4. PROPULSION OPTIONS
Overall, there are three major subsets of propulsion systems: cold gas, electrical,
and chemical; although other types and hybrid systems do exist.
2.4.1. Cold Gas Systems. Cold gas systems are the simplest of the propulsion
options available to satellite designers. Conceptually such a system is little more than a
pressurized tank, a control valve, and a nozzle. Cold gas thrusters work by accelerating
an inert, high-pressure gas, typically Nitrogen or Xenon, through a nozzle to produce
thrust.
While the systems are valued for their relative simplicity and are often employed
for attitude control, cold gas systems do have limitations. The high-pressure propellant
storage often leads to system leaks causing up to 10% of the stored propellant mass to be
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lost. [8] In addition to propellant loss, the systems are not nearly as efficient as other
propulsion options and cannot generate the high forces necessary for certain orbital
maneuvers.
2.4.2. Chemical Systems. Chemical systems have a long history of providing
both access to space and propulsion for satellites. Their greatest advantage over other
propulsion systems is the high thrust they are capable of producing. Working in similar
fashion to Cold Gas Thrusters, Chemical systems rely on a combustion process to impart
energy into the flow before it is accelerated out the nozzle.
Many differing configurations of chemical propulsion systems are available to
satellite designers including liquid propellant, solid propellant, and hybrid systems. Each
configuration has both advantages and disadvantages depending on the intended use of
the system. For satellite propulsion, liquid propellant systems—both monopropellant and
bipropellant—are used due to their ability to be throttled.
2.4.3. Electrical Systems. Over the years electrical propulsion systems have
become much more prevalent in spacecraft design. Such systems utilize electromagnetic
(EM) forces to impart energy into a flow and accelerate propellant; thus generating thrust.
EM systems are highly valued for their Isp and the efficiency it implies. Electric systems
come in many configurations from electro-thermal resistojets to plasma expelling HALL
thrusters.

Each thruster type has different power requirements and performance

characteristics; thus, the type of thruster employed for a particular satellite mission is
determined by mission requirements and system resources.
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2.5. SURVEY OF SMALL SATELLITE PROPULSION
Many of the first small satellites did not utilize any propulsive methods; instead
relying on proper orbit insertion and spin stabilization to complete their missions. As
small satellites began to require the ability to alter their orbit during the mission,
propulsion systems became incorporated into the design.
For example, the 90 kg amateur radio satellite, OSCAR 10, was launched on June
16, 1983 as the first amateur built satellite to incorporate a propulsive system. [7] The
propulsion system was a liquid bipropellant chemical system featuring an S400 engine
designed to insert the satellite into the desired orbit and maintain the orbit once reached.
[9] However, a collision with the launch vehicle coupled with a longer than expected
firing time of the thruster saw the satellite fail to achieve the desired orbit. A second
attempt to fire the thruster failed due to a loss of pressurization within the helium
blowdown system and the subsequent loss of propellant and oxidizer pressure. [10]
Traditional cold gas thruster systems also came to be incorporated into small
satellites.

For instance, in 1991 the DARPA Microsat mission consisted of a

constellation of small satellites each fitted with a cold gas propulsion system utilizing
nitrogen as propellant. While each 22.7 kg satellite was designed with four years worth
of propellant initially stored at 6000 psi, a lower than intended orbit caused the formation
to deorbit after only a year of operation. [11] The European Space Agency (ESA) also
employed a traditional cold gas thruster system for its original Cryosat mission launched
in 2005. The propulsion system designed for both attitude and orbit control stored 36.2
kg of nitrogen in a single propellant tank at 4040 psi. [12] The mission was to last for
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three years; however, the launch vehicle failed during liftoff and the satellite was lost.
[13]
Electric thrusters have also been implemented into small satellites. The 300 kg
Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) UoSAT-12 launched in 1999 and employed
both a cold gas thruster system and an electro-thermal propulsion system. The 0.125 N
resistojet utilized nitrous-oxide propellant heated by a 100 W resistive heating element.
The thruster was designed for orbit maintenance and could raise the 650 km orbit a full 3
km in one hour’s time. The 2.5 kg of propellant allowed for 14 hours of thruster
operation. [14] [15]
Finally, non-traditional cold gas thruster systems utilizing liquefied gas as
propellant have been successfully flown.

The University of Toronto Institute for

Aerospace Studies’ (UTIAS) CanX-2 nanosatellite was launched in April 2008. [16] The
mission was a technology demonstration of among other systems a micropropulsion
system utilizing sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) as a propellant. As designed, the 10 mL
propellant tank stored sufficient SF6 at a MEOP of 500 psi to provide 2 m/s of ΔV. The
system will also provide 50 mN of thrust and have an Isp of approximately 45 s. [17]
The SSTL SNAP-1 satellite launched in June 2000 also employed a cold gas propulsion
system utilizing liquefied gas as propellant. The uniquely designed system used butane
as propellant in a rendezvous mission between small satellites. A total of 32.6 grams of
butane was stored as a liquid within a 1.1 m coiled tube with an internal volume of 65
cm3. The propellant was vaporized by a 15 ohm (4.3 W at 8 Vdc) resistive heater prior to
expulsion to provide a theoretical ΔV of 3.47 m/s.

Orbital data showed the initial

propulsive maneuvers of the SNAP-1 satellite were both at higher thruster levels than
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predicted and erratic in thrust produced. This suggests that liquid propellant droplets
were expelled along with the gas; thus creating higher thrust at reduced propulsive
efficiency. [18]
2.6. ROLE OF UNIVERSITY PROJECTS
Universities hold a special place within the space industry. While university
projects traditionally lack the resources, in terms of both experience and money, of
industry projects, they more than make up for this in terms of design freedom. Whereas
industry must adhere to conservative principles and above all the bottom line, university
projects have the freedom to explore new methods and technologies.
Given this freedom offered by university projects, it seems only prudent for
companies to form a partnership with universities to develop programs focus on areas of
interest to the space community. In this way, university projects can directly benefit
industry interests while at the same time developing and training a new generation for the
workforce.
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3. SYSTEM DESIGN OVERVIEW

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The propulsion system for the MR SAT formation flight mission was designed to
meet the needs of the satellite while fitting within the guidelines and time constraints of
the NS4 program. As such, certain design aspects of the system are products of necessity
and not necessarily directly related to the mission requirements. This section describes
the system as designed and details the choices, compromises, and iterations of the design
process.
3.2. INITIAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The beginning of any design process is an important period with far reaching
repercussions on the final design, particularly for projects with short durations and time
tables. The MR SAT project, as part of the University Nanosat Program, had a two year
concept-to-product time table with much of that time allocated to building the system.
As a consequence, the initial design choices for the MR SAT propulsion system were
made in the context of information available to the designers early on in the project with
such choices being re-examined as new information became available.
3.2.1. Pertinent Mission Requirements.

As discussed in Section 1, the

propulsion system for MR SAT has three mission requirements. Stated briefly, the
Propulsion subsystem is charged with providing the means for both responsive attitude
control and orbital control for formation flight. Each mission statement is examined
below as to its rationale and the consequences for propulsion design.
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3.2.1.1 Provide means to maintain attitude and orbit control. Attitude and
orbit control are vitally important to the successful completion of the M SAT mission.
Attitude control is particularly essential in that without tight bounds on the orientation of
the satellite while in orbit, communication with the ground would be impossible. Also,
proper orientation is important for the solar panels to maintain the appropriate level of
solar exposure and sustain the power levels for the satellite. The goal of the Attitude
subsystem is to maintain attitude control within ±7 degrees of nominal satellite
orientation. [19] While means other than propulsion do exist for attitude control, these
devices are not as responsive and require significantly more time to slowly change the
attitude of the satellite. During the formation flight mode of the mission, and particularly
immediately after the deployment of MRS SAT, quick response to changing rotation
rates is necessary.
To satisfy the attitude control requirements for the mission, the MR SAT
propulsion system must be capable of providing full three-axis rotational control. This in
turn means that a system with multiple thrusters is required. Also, as discussed in
Section 2, a balance must be struck between the response time of the system and the
precision of the attitude maneuvers to avoid overcompensating and propellant waste.
3.2.1.2 Provide means to maintain 50 meter formation with MRS SAT. The
mission for the MR SAT project involves two satellites autonomously maintaining a
follow/lead formation.

Upon launch, the two satellites are coupled in a stack

arrangement connected by a separation device. After separation, the formation must
quickly be formed and any relative velocities overcome. Worst-case scenarios indicate
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that the two satellites will reach the desired 50 meter separation distance in two minutes.
Therefore, any propulsion system designed to implement formation flight for this mission
must have the capacity, i.e. available thrust, to quickly mitigate relative velocities and
establish the proper formation. Once the formation is formed, it must be maintained
within the specified bounds by the use of the propulsion system. To achieve this as
efficiently as possible, it is necessary to be able to thrust in as many translational axes as
possible, thus eliminating unnecessary rotational maneuvers.
3.2.1.3 Provide sufficient performance for one orbit of formation flight. The
lifetime of the mission is a major consideration and is, at least for the purposes of
formation flight, defined by available propellant mass. To demonstrate that the methods
utilized by the MR SAT program to conduct autonomous formation flight are valid and
effective, a minimum mission duration is required to insure that adequate data are
collected. Obviously longer time spans are desirable and would provide more data;
however, one orbit of formation flight was chosen as the minimum mission lifetime since
it was deemed effective for demonstration purposes and feasible given program
requirements.
Ensuring adequate performance to achieve one orbit of formation flight is made
far more difficult by the volumetric and mass constraints placed upon the system.
Storage of large masses of propellant at safe pressures, as defined by the NS4 User’s
Guide, necessitates the use of large volume storage vessels. However, since the exact
amount of propellant necessary for the mission was unknown and unknowable early in
the design process, a design providing as much Δ V as possible was preferred.
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3.2.2. MR SAT Propulsion Options.

Defining the mission objectives and

understanding the program guidelines and requirement allowed the initial design of the
MR SAT propulsion system to be determined.

Due to volumetric, mass, and time

considerations, the Propulsion subsystem endeavored to design a single propulsion
system to encompass both attitude and orbital control during formation flight as opposed
to a separate system for each need. In the sections below, the pros and cons of the three
main system options are discussed.
3.2.2.1 Chemical systems for MR SAT propulsion. Chemical systems were not
considered a viable option for the MR SAT mission despite performance characteristics
within the bands necessary for successful completion of the mission. The issue with such
systems was not complexity; indeed systems are available commercially specifically
designed for small satellites, but rather the chemical reaction process inherent to their
use. NS4 guidelines on propulsion systems prohibit chemical reactions and combustion
as unsafe practices; however, should a satellite be constructed outside the UNP, chemical
systems could be explored as a possible propulsion option.

This is especially true

considering that at minimum chemical systems have nearly double the ISP of cold gas
systems.
3.2.2.2 Electrical systems for MR SAT propulsion. Electrical systems merited
some consideration. With the total required ΔV of the mission as yet undefined the
relatively high ISP values of electric propulsion made such systems attractive. Relatively
simple electrical systems such as resistojets, arcjets, and micro pulsed plasma thrusters
(µPPT) were all briefly considered for the primary propulsive means of MR SAT.
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Resistojets are one step more advanced than cold gas thrusters in that they utilize
small resistive heaters just prior to the nozzle to add energy to the flow. The added
energy increases the efficiency of the thrust generation and thus preserves propellant
mass. Arcjets work in much the same manner only utilizing an electric arc instead of
resistive heaters to accomplish the heat addition. While both these devices would help
extend formation flight time by increasing system efficiency; it comes at the cost of extra
system mass for power conditioning units and added power draw on the satellite. The
need for multiple thrusters, lack of experience with electrical propulsion, and the limited
power available on the satellite made both resistojets and arcjets infeasible for
implementation in MR SAT.
As an alternative, µPPTs are traditionally used for attitude control work since they
are capable of very small impulse maneuvers and work in a pulsed fashion instead of the
continuous flow achieved by other systems. As such they do not truly meet the needs of
the M SAT mission; however, should two systems be employed to perform attitude and
orbit control separately, µPPTs would be a possibility for the attitude control
requirement.

For this reason, a prototype µPPT was to be included on MR SAT,

assuming space, mass, and power for the device were available, as a technology
demonstration for future missions.
3.2.2.3 Cold gas thrusters for MR SAT propulsion.

Cold gas thrusters were

perhaps the best option for MR SAT propulsion given their simple design and
implementation requirements. The concept and laws governing the fluid flow were
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familiar to the Propulsion subsystem and thus could be implemented by the student
designers quickly.
The limiting factor with cold gas thrusters is the third mission requirement of
producing a system capable of providing a full orbit of formation flight. While the
required total ΔV for the mission was not yet known, the theoretical performance of the
system using traditional propellants and tanks of reasonable volumes was not
encouraging. For example, a 2.5 liter tank of nitrogen when stored under the safe
conditions set by the UNP and ignoring the likely loss of 10% of the propellant mass is
only capable of producing 0.47 m/s of ΔV. [20]
While cold gas thrusters offered the greatest chance of success for the Propulsion
subsystem in terms of completing the system, clearly the issue of propellant choice and
storage had to be carefully considered and became an integral design aspect.
3.2.2.4 Chosen system for MR SAT propulsion.

To achieve the mission

objectives utilizing the cold gas thruster concept, a method of low-pressure, high-density
propellant storage was imperative.

This is not possible with traditional gaseous

propellants as density and pressure are directly related for a container at a given
temperature. Employing a liquid propellant realizes the necessary storage conditions;
however, the expulsion of liquid propellant greatly reduces the efficiency of the
propulsive device. Therefore, a compromise system, where propellant is stored as a
liquid and yet expelled through the nozzle as a gas, was sought by the Propulsion
subsystem.
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A saturated-liquid propellant is a good choice to attain just such a compromise.
Saturated-liquids are substances that over a given temperature range can exist in both the
liquid and gaseous states. Using such propellants, extra propellant mass can be stored in
the tank as a higher density a liquid while the vapors are extracted and expelled to
produce thrust.

Identifying the specific saturated-liquid that met all the safety and

performance guidelines was challenging and necessitated consultation with the Missouri
S&T Chemistry Department.
In the end the selected propellant was the refrigerant R-134a due to its nonreactive, non-toxic, and performance properties. The refrigerant was to be used with the
cold gas concept as the basis for MR SAT propulsion.
3.2.3. Configuration Possibilities.

The placement and orientation of the

thrusters within the confines of the satellite is critical to the final performance of the
propulsion system; affecting both the rotation rates produced by the system and overall
efficiency of maneuvers. Thruster placement also is important with regard to integrating
the propulsion system into the satellite in a manner that avoids conflict with other satellite
systems.
The main objective when configuring the thruster locations was to ensure the
system could perform the attitude and orbit maneuvers required by the mission
statements; i.e. the system had full three-axis rotational control and multiple axis
translational control.

However, additional considerations required placing further

restrictions on thruster placement to ease system integration. The first of these
requirements entailed avoiding the top and bottom panels of MR SAT since these panels
are contact points for MRS SAT and the launch vehicle, respectively.

Also, the
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placement of thrusters in the middle of panels was discouraged due to possible
interference with other satellite systems. Finally, system complexity and overall cost was
to be reduced by minimizing the number of thrusters needed to accomplish the mission
goals.
The configuration of thrusters for MR SAT was the product of the aforementioned
reasons and time constraints; however, to exemplify the thought process necessary for
designing a functional thruster pattern, the configuration used for MR SAT plus two other
possible designs are analyzed below.
3.2.3.1 Twelve thruster configuration. The twelve thruster configuration is the
most straightforward of the possible thruster arrangements for MR SAT. Four thrusters
are placed in each translational plane of motion and arranged in such a way so the thrust
vector from half the thruster group directly opposes that of the other half. To perform
both translational and rotational maneuvers pairs of thrusters would fire in tandem; the
specific pair of thrusters selected determining the maneuver performed. Figure 3.1 shows
what this thruster configuration would look like when implemented into MR SAT as well
as which thruster pairs perform which maneuvers.
This design has the benefit of providing direct maneuvering capability in all three
translational and rotational axes; however, this comes at the cost of increased system
complexity and cost due to the number of thrusters required. Additionally, the design
requires thrusters to either be placed on the top and bottom panels of MR SAT and risk
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Figure 3.1: Maneuver Pairings - Twelve Thruster Configuration

interference with satellite connection points or be placed along solar panels and risk
possible solar cell contamination.
3.2.3.2 Eight thruster angled configuration.

The angled nature of this

configuration allows fewer thrusters to perform the same set of maneuvers as the twelve
thruster configuration. In this configuration, two sets of four thrusters are arranged on
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opposing panels. The thrusters are arranged in a square pattern with each thruster placed
at a corner and angled 45° as seen in Figure 3.2. Four thrusters are fired simultaneously
to achieve the desired thrust vector(s) for both rotational and translation maneuvers (see
Figure 3.2 for maneuver groupings).

Figure 3.2: Maneuver Pairings - Eight Thrusters at 45 Degrees
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While such an arrangement does indeed provide a system capable of three axis
rotational and translational maneuvers, it does so at the cost of overall system efficiency.
The angled nature of the thrusters means that a portion of the force produced by each
thruster is canceled out by the actions of the other active thrusters. In fact, only a little
over half (0.577) of the available thrust is converted into the resultant force vector.
Additionally, achieving the precision in thruster placement and alignment necessary in
order to ensure proper thrust vectors for such a design would drastically complicate the
integration process. In the end, the inefficiency of this design and the difficulties with
integration were not compatible with the needs and requirements of MR SAT.
3.2.3.3 Eight thruster straight configuration. The thruster configuration chosen
for MR SAT employs eight thrusters but does away with the angle of the previous
configuration. Instead of an equal number of thrusters in opposition, this method uses a
single thruster directed through the CG of the satellite to offset the translational force of a
thruster on the opposing panel in order to produce torque. Figure 3.3 shows the thruster
configuration and the thruster pairs utilized for various maneuvers.
The design does an adequate job in meeting the requirements of MR SAT in that
all rotational axes are controlled and the number of valves within the system is reduced;
however, the translational axis through the top and bottom of MR SAT is left
uncontrolled.
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Figure 3.3: Maneuver Pairings - Eight Thrusters Straight Configuration

3.3. SYSTEM DESIGN
With the preliminary design decisions for the MR SAT propulsion system
complete, the next phase of design began.

Within this phase, specific component

requirements were developed to ensure successful integration into a unified propulsion
system. Components were then sourced to meet the necessary criteria; moving the design
from a general concept to a physical model utilizing real world components integrated
into a cohesive system.
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3.3.1. System Components. The components that make up a system determine
the function and efficiency of that system; each component performing a particular task
and adhering to specific requirements.

While a cold gas propulsion system is

conceptually simple, incorporating physical components in the design presented
challenges and required strict selection criteria.
3.3.1.1 Propellant tank. The propellant tank was a key component for the MR
SAT propulsion system given the type of propellant selected. During the development of
tank requirements it was necessary to consider the unique challenges presented by
propellants stored in a saturated liquid state. Specifically, the tank must be equipped with
a passive means to combat and prevent propellant slosh within the tank while on orbit.
Propellant slosh occurs when the liquid propellant within the tank moves
separately from the satellite structure; potentially disrupting the prescribed motion of the
satellite. The problem arises due to the way liquids behave in a zero g environment.
Under the influence of gravity, liquids conform to the bottom of the containment vessel;
however, without gravity liquids tend to form large globules moving freely within the
tank. Propellant Management Devices (PMDs) are established inside storage tanks to
control slosh effects by breaking up large globules and restricting the free motion of
liquids.

Another function often assigned to PMDs is ensuring that the propellant

extracted from the tank is in the correct state, either liquid or gas.
Therefore, the use of R-134a as a propellant set the major requirement for the
propellant tank. Any tank considered for use on MR SAT would require an internal PMD
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capable of working with R-134a and designed to extract the gaseous state from the tank.
This and additional requirements are listed in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: Propellant Tank Requirements [21]
Requirement
Reason
Necessary to control propellant slosh and ensure that the
Integrated PMD
proper phase is extracted from the tank.
Safety requirement imposed by UNP officials. Composite
All Metal Construction materials are deemed too great a risk without additional
metal wrapping.
Exceeding the bounds of the satellite would violate UNP
Fit Within the
regulations. In addition, available volume is limited by not
Available Volume of
only overall satellite dimensions, but also the volume
MR SAT
necessary for other satellite components.
Possess a Minimum
This volume was deemed necessary to provide sufficient
Internal Volume of 2 L propellant mass for satellite operations.
Theoretical Burst
Factor of Safety required by UNP. Ensures that pressure
Pressure 5X Greater
fluctuations will not cause a catastrophic breach of the
than MEOP
tank.
Reasonably Priced
The M-SAT team was working with a limited budget.

Two of the restrictions limited the options for commercially available tanks more
than any other.

With a small satellite, the tank must be correspondingly small in

dimension. Many of the tanks sourced by the Propulsion Subsystem were simply too
large to fit within the available volume of MR SAT. Also, most commercially available
tanks were designed either without integrated PMDs or with PMDs manufactured for
liquid phase extraction.
While many tanks were considered, only the Marotta BS25-001 tank fit all the
design criteria set forth by the Propulsion subsystem. The 2.5 L tank had an incorporated
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PMD originally designed to prevent liquid butane from being injected into propellant
lines; however, it would work equally well for R-134a. An additional benefit of Marotta
tank was its proven flight history and hence its space qualified nature.

Further

information on the selected tank can be found in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2: Flight Tank Specifications [21]
Operational Temperature
-40 °C to 65 °C -40 °F to 150 °F
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure
1.600 MPa
232 psi
(MEOP)
Minimum Burst Pressure (MBP)
9.7975 MPa
1421 psi
3
Volume Capacity
2500 cm
153 in3
Mass
1.476 kg
3.25 lb
Maximum Body Length
32.6 cm
12.83 in
Outside Diameter
110.314 mm
4.24 in
Factor of Safety (MEOP : MBP)
6:1

3.3.1.2 Isolation valves.

Safety is the foremost concern of UNP officials.

Pressurized systems are inherently more prone to failure and, as such, merit additional
safety requirements and stipulations. As a safety measure the UNP mandates that each
pressurized system must have three mechanical inhibits; one of which must be failsafe.
For the purposes of the MR SAT propulsion system, it was determined that two
isolation valves would serve as the initial two inhibits with the thruster control valve
serving as the final inhibit on each propellant line. For simplicity sake, the two isolation
valves were to be of the same design. Therefore, the most important aspect of isolation
valve selection was the failsafe nature of the chosen design. In terms of valve design,
failsafe means that the valves’ default position is closed and, therefore, any interruption
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in signal will shut off the flow and secure the propellant. The overall requirements for
the isolation valves can be found in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Isolation Valve Requirements
Requirement
Reason
Safety feature prevents the release of propellant in the
Failsafe Design
event of a failure. Mandated by UNP.
Low outgassing materials lose less matter when exposed
Sealant is low
to a vacuum. Loss of material can lead to valve leakage
outgassing
and material deposits on other sensitive equipment.
Additionally, low outgassing is mandated by UNP.
R-134a is considered chemically inert, but can dissolve
Compatible with Rcertain plastics and rubber materials.
Ensuring
134a
compatibility prevents seal failure.
Isolation valves will see the full pressure of the system
4 x FOS over MEOP
and must be able to withstand the force.

After an extensive search and consultation with experienced industry
representatives, a micro-dispense solenoid valve from Lee Valve Company was selected.
The original selected valve was the INKX0512050A, however, this valve was only proof
tested to 199 MPa (289 psia) which does not meet the required FOS of 4.0. Discussions
with Lee yielded a derivative of the INKX0512050A valve that was slightly larger and
proof tested to 5.17 MPa (750 psi). Figure 3.4 shows the MR SAT isolation valve from
Lee Valve Company.
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Figure 3.4: Lee Valve Company INKX0512050A Micro-Solenoid Valve

Also discussed with Lee was the possibility of changing the internal sealant used
within the valve to a material compatible with R-134a.

These discussions are still

ongoing as a suitable material that is also low outgassing and moldable (per Lee
manufacturing requirement) has yet to be found. In the mean time, the valves were
ordered with EPDM seals which are compatible with R-134a but have unknown
outgassing properties. Other pertinent valve characteristics are detailed in Table 3.4.
3.3.1.3 Pressure regulator. For peak performance, each thruster needs to be
provided with constant and predictable flow characteristics. Without regulated pressure,
the flow delivered to the nozzle would change as tank pressure falls due to propellant use.
Thus, the system requires a pressure regulator downstream of the tank for optimum
system performance.
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Table 3.4: MR SAT Valve Specifications [22]
Mass
7 grams
Proof Pressure (Lee Co. rating)
5.17 MPa (750 psi)
Burst Pressure (Lee Co. rating)
7.76 MPa (1125 psi)
Rated Thermal Environment
-18 °C to 70 °C
Open Response Time – 689.48 kPa (100 pisg)
0.25 ms
Close Response Time – 689.48 kPa (100 pisg)
< 3.0 ms
Actuation Voltage
24 V spike
Actuation Power (Maximum Average)
0.75 W

Pressure regulators are in essence spring loaded check valves. When the pressure
downstream of the regulator exceeds a preset value, flow from upstream of the regulator
is restricted; however, when the downstream pressure is below the set point, the regulator
allows propellant to flow unimpeded.
Any potential pressure regulator for the MR SAT propulsion system needed to
meet two key parameters for consideration: a factory set regulated pressure (i.e. nonadjustable) and be functional in vacuum.

While adjustable regulators would have

allowed the downstream pressure to be optimized for most efficient thrust maneuvers, a
concern was that during launch the excessive vibrations could cause the set point to vary
and thus negate any possible advantage. The need for vacuum functionality seems selfexplanatory; however, many regulators utilize vent holes to take atmospheric pressure
into account and thus it was an important issue when sourcing viable pressure regulators.
Table 3.5 presents the requirements necessary of a pressure regulator for MR SAT.
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Table 3.5: Pressure Regulator Requirements
Requirement
Reason
Adjustability increases component complexity.
Non-adjustable Setting
Set point could vary due to launch vibration.
Requirement highly suggested by AFRL.
Avoid vent holes which may lead to propellant
Vacuum functionality
leakage.
Many regulators have internal components of
Wetted surfaces compatible
plastic or rubber which must be compatible with
with R-134a
the propellant
A lower regulated pressure reduces the impulse of
each thruster firing, and thus allows for more
Low pressure setting
precise maneuvers. Also increases the time that
tank pressure is above regulated pressure (i.e.
regulators functional time).
The M SAT team was working on a budget and
space rated components often were out of the
Reasonably priced
team’s price range.

Four companies were initially considered as vendors for the MR SAT pressure
regulator; Moog, Beswick, Tescom, and Swagelok.

However, only the Swagelok

regulator met all the requirements. The Moog 50E741 pressure regulator had the benefit
of being space rated, but was also excessively massive for a small satellite and cost
upwards of $50,000.

The Beswick and Tescom regulators also failed to meet the

subsystem’s guidelines by having a reference vent hole and an adjustment device,
respectively.
The Swagelok model chosen for use on MR SAT was the HFS3B compact
pressure regulator designed for use with high flow gases. The device was calibrated to a
preset outlet pressure of 68.95 kPa (10 psig, 24.7 psia) and certified to work after
upstream pressure falls below the preset value.

The Swagelok regulator had the
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additional benefit of easy integration since it was an inline model and could be equipped
with standard Swagelok fittings. Regulator specifications can be found in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: MR SAT Pressure Regulator Specifications [22]
Preset outlet pressure
68.95 kPa (10 psig, 24.7 psia)
Mass (measured)
176 grams
Temperature range
-40 °C to 70 °C
Inlet pressure range
Vacuum to 6.89 MPa (1000 psig)
Operating temperature range
-23 °C to 65 °C
Orifice size
3 mm (0.12 in)
Flow capacity
100 std. L/min
Leak rate (He)
1 x 10-9 std. cm3/sec

3.3.1.4 Thrusters. The thrusters for the MR SAT propulsion system were to
consist of three main components; a Swagelok fitting, an actuation valve, and a nozzle.
Manufacturing the nozzle to the necessary tolerances and scale was determined to be
beyond the fabrication abilities of M SAT design team, and as such, the thruster
assemblies were to be internally designed and externally sourced. Therefore, Micro
Aerospace Solutions (MAS) a company in Melbourne, Florida with experience in micro
propulsion systems was contacted by then Propulsion Lead, Carl Seubert to assist in the
design and fabrication of the MR SAT thrusters.
The valve component of the thruster assembly was chosen at the same time and in
the same manner as the system isolation valves; thus the inhibit requirement was satisfied
by the same valve model in all three cases. The remaining design considerations for the
thrusters were focused on overall thruster shape and nozzle design. The shape of the
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thrusters, or how the three main components are configured within the assembly, was
important for integration considerations. Each thruster must be securely fixed to the
satellite structure in the correct orientation which requires a method of attachment based
upon the final configuration of the thruster. The requirements pertaining to thruster
assembly configuration can be found in Table 3.7 below.

Table 3.7: Configuration Requirements for Thruster Assembly
Requirement
Reason
Fixed orientation is necessary to ensure the
Provide means to secure thruster
system is capable of performing the required
to structure
maneuvers correctly.
If the nozzle is obstructed by the honeycomb
panels it will not be able to produce thrust.
Nozzle extends beyond
Also, the nozzle being merely even with the
honeycomb panels
surface of the honeycomb panels could lead to
solar cells being contaminated by R-134a.
The propellant lines must be connected to the
Allow for straightforward
thruster in a manner that provides support for
propellant line attachment
the lines.

An “L” shape with the bend placed between the Swagelok fitting and the valve, as
seen in Figure 3.5, was chosen as the basic shape for the thruster assembly. This allowed
the thruster to be attached securely to the structure at the fitting, thus preventing
unnecessary stress upon the thin and relatively delicate valve tubing.

With this

configuration, the Swagelok fitting rests upon the inside surface of the isogrid panel
while the valve and nozzle protrude through the panel and past the honeycomb solar
panel.
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Figure 3.5: "L" Shape Configuration for MR SAT Thruster

Figure 3.6 shows the necessary dimensions for the thruster configuration to ensure
the nozzle extends sufficiently past the solar panels. Finally, this configuration allowed
propellant lines to run along the inside surface of the isogrid panels, which provided a
means to secure them as well. While other configuration possibilities for the thruster
assemblies do exist and could have worked equally well, they were not explored given
sufficiency of this design.
The nozzle portion of the thruster design was more complex as it was necessary to
balance opposing performance requirements while designing a machinable part. Analysis
performed by Carl Seubert demonstrated improved ΔV performance for the system given
a higher nozzle Aspect Ratio (AR), the ratio between nozzle exit area (Ae) and throat area
(AT).
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Figure 3.6: Thruster Schematic

However, this improvement comes at the expense of lower overall thrust
produced per thruster firing which adversely affects the response times for attitude
maneuvers [22]. Therefore, a compromise AR which extends mission life time, ΔV,
while providing sufficient thrust for attitude control was a primary requirement for the
nozzle design.
Machining issues became prominent due to the small size and the necessary
tolerances of the part to be machined. The machining process greatly affected the final
AR chosen for the nozzle since machining tolerances limit the minimum diameter
possible for the throat. MAS is capable of machining parts accurately within 0.001
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inches (0.0254 mm) meaning that a part may vary plus or minus a thousandth of an inch
off specified dimensions. This is especially important for AT since as the throat area
approaches the accuracy limit the variation in machining has a correspondingly greater
influence on the performance of the nozzle.

The small part size also affects the

complexity of the shape that can be attempted. In larger parts, complex shapes involving
relatively smooth curves are possible; however, when applied to smaller parts, the
accuracy limit of the machining process could cause relatively large variations in the
designed curvature. Thus, simple nozzle shapes were necessary to prevent undue system
losses. The requirements associated with the nozzle design can be found in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Nozzle Design Requirements
Requirement
Reason
High AR gives higher ΔV but lower thrust. A
An AR that sufficiently meets
compromise which meets the needs and
all design requirements
requirements of the mission is necessary.
The AT must be much greater than the machining
Machinable AT
tolerances of MAS to reduce the influence of
machining variability on system performance.
Complex interior surfaces are difficult to
accurately manufacture due to the small part size.
Simple interior shape
This in turn could lead to additional system losses
due to friction and boundary layer affects.
The thruster is likely to experience thermal
gradients. Using the same material in each
component of the thruster assembly ensures
Stainless steel construction
thermal expansion rates should be similar and
thus reduces the possibility of leaks and stress
induced by thermal expansion.
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In consultation with MAS, the nozzle design was finalized and met all
requirements placed upon it by the Propulsion subsystem.

The design called for a

stainless steel converging/diverging nozzle utilizing straight cones in both the converging
and diverging sections. The straight cone shape is not as efficient as the bell-shaped
section often seen in larger rocket nozzles, but is far easier to manufacture accurately.
The diameter of the throat was set at 0.5 mm with the exit diameter set at 5 mm to ensure
the structural strength of the outer edge. Thus, the aspect ratio is 100, which is a fine
compromise between ΔV and thrust as seen in Section 3.3.3 “Expected Performance.” A
diagram of the nozzle design can be found in Figure 3.7.

Figure 3.7: Nozzle Schematic
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3.3.1.5 Propellant lines and fittings. Any pressurized system is only as robust
as the lines, connections, and fittings used in its assembly. They provide the means for
propellant to flow from the source tank to thruster assemblies and eventually out the
nozzle to produce thrust. When developing the requirements for the propellant line
system restrictions and recommendations from the UNP and AFRL officials played a
significant role. Many of the recommendations focused on practices known to reduce the
possibility of propellant leakage within the system, a common problem with cold gas
thrusters. The requirements stemming from these recommendations and restrictions are
listed in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9: Propellant Line and Fitting Requirements
Requirement
Reason
Polymer or rubber propellant lines are more likely
Lines and fittings must be
to fail especially under the vacuum conditions of
constructed of metal
space. It is also an outgassing risk.
This was more a suggestion as past use of flexible
tubing, even of metal construction, has been shown
Avoid use of flexible tubing
to cause problems with connections and thus
increased leak rates.
Connections of different metals with different
Lines and fittings made of the
thermal expansion rates could lead to excess stress
same material
placed on the system or increased leak rates.
Welding performed by the team is against the
Non-welded connections
policies of the UNP.
With the restriction on welded connections,
Fittings and connections with compression fittings were the only choice left to the
low leak rates
subsystem; however, choosing a compression fitting
with a low leak rate is still prudent.
Fittings must be able to fit on Many of the panels are crowded with other system
the isogrid panels
components and thus space is limited.
The propellant lines will experience the full
Maintain a FOS of at least
pressure of the system and therefore must be able to
four over MEOP
safely contain such pressure.
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There were many different types of fittings available for use in sealed systems
such as the MR SAT propulsion system. The majority of the connections within the
system were to be tubing connections rather than threaded, and therefore compression
fittings figured prominently in the product search. At first Army/Navy (AN) standard
37° flare fittings were considered for use with MR SAT propulsion. These fittings
require the end of the tubing to be flared out into a trumpet shape which is then fitted
over a similarly shaped cone on the fitting. A compression nut forces the cone into the
flare and seals the connection. A diagram of this arrangement can be seen in Figure 3.8.
After consultation with AFRL personnel, the use of AN fittings was abandoned as
previous satellite teams had had difficulty attaining a proper seal with their use. Instead,
AFRL officials suggested the use of Swagelok fittings which utilize a double ferrule
design to both lock the tubing in place and seal the connection. A schematic of this can
be found in Figure 3.9.

Figure 3.8: Schematic of an AN flare Type Fitting
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Figure 3.9: Swagelok Double Ferrule [23]

Aluminum tubing and 0.25 inch aluminum Swagelok fittings were sought for use
with the propulsion system; however, two problems with this intent quickly became
apparent. First, after modeling the system with 0.25 inch fittings and tubing in NX3 it
was clear that the fittings and tubing simply would not work within the satellite. The
fittings were too large to comfortably fit upon panels containing other subsystem
components and the tubing required a minimum bend radius that also interfered with
other components. Secondly, many of the required fittings simply did not come with an
option of aluminum construction.
The final design utilized 0.125 inch OD (outside diameter) stainless steel tubing
and the corresponding stainless steel Swagelok fittings. The tubing was designed with a
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wall thickness of 0.02 inches making the tubing capable of handling up to 23,985.3 psia;
well above the required FOS of 4.0.
3.3.1.6 Tank and line heaters. Two-phase storage of the propellant allows a
greater propellant mass to be stored in an equivalent volume at a comparable pressure;
however, before the liquid propellant can be effectively converted into thrust it must be
transformed to the gaseous state. Also, as propellant is expelled from the tank, both tank
temperature and pressure decrease causing a loss of thruster efficiency and possibly
leading to an interruption in propellant flow. For these reasons, a method of adding
energy into the system had to be devised in order to sustain the necessary phase change
and maintain the thermodynamic conditions of the tank. Additionally, the possibility of
propellant condensation within the propellant lines had to be addressed and mitigated to
ensure the maximum possible efficiency of the system.
A minimum of two heaters were required by the system; one on the propellant
tank to provide energy for the liquid to gas phase change, and the other situated upon the
propellant line to help prevent re-condensation. More heaters would more effectively
prevent propellant condensation; however, such resistive heating consumes excessive
amounts of electrical power. At the time of heater selection, the power budget for MR
SAT was uncertain with the exact available power unknown.

As a result, it was

imperative to select heaters which utilized a minimum of electrical power while still
maintaining the thermal control necessary for the M SAT mission. The requirement for
heater selection can be found in Table 3.10.
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Table 3.10: Propellant Tank and Line Heater Requirements
Requirement
Reason
The power of any satellite is limited and each
Low power consumption
component must minimize the power consumed.
Made of low-outgassing
Low-outgassing materials are mandated by the
material
UNP guidelines.
The heaters must be fixed to round components
such as the propellant tank and propellant lines. As
Flexible material
such, they must be flexible to ensure efficient
contact.
The heater must be securely fixed to the propellant
Adhesive mounting
tank and lines.

The heaters chosen for use with the MR SAT propulsion system were developed
by Minco. The heaters are made of the polyimide film, Kapton, over a metallic heating
element chosen to obtain the required resistance. Kapton is widely used in the space
industry for its low-outgassing properties. Each heater also has an aluminum backing to
ensure that the heaters conform to the curved surface of the tanks and lines. Finally, the
heaters are attached using an acrylic pressure-sensitive adhesive which also meets
outgassing requirements and secured using shrink bands. Heater specifications can be
found in Table 3.11.

Heater
Location
Tank
Propellant
Line

Table 3.11: Heater Specifications [21]
Output
Dimensions
Resistance
Wattage Voltage (V)
cm (in)
(Ohms)
(W)
12.70 x 30.734
13.1
3.63
6.9
(5.00 x 12.10)
0.864 x 8.814
33.9
1.06
6
(0.34 x 3.47)

Lead Gauge
AWG 24
AWG 30
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3.3.1.7 State sensors. Throughout the mission, it would be useful to have an
indication of how effectively the system is functioning. This ensures that the propulsion
system can adapt to changing situations and always operate at peak performance. Both
pressure and temperature sensors were to be incorporated within the propulsion system to
constantly monitor state properties. The temperature sensors fall under control of the
Thermal subsystem, and as such, the input from the Propulsion subsystem was limited to
number and location. Two sensors will be placed on either end of the propellant tank to
monitor the temperature shift as the system is utilized with another sensor located on the
main propellant line.
For the purposes of safety and thruster performance, pressure monitoring was
imperative to the operation of the system. Two pressure monitoring devices were needed
for complete system coverage since two distinct pressure regimes are present: tank
pressure and regulated pressure. The most important aspect of pressure transducer design
for the MR SAT propulsion system was the pressure range over which the transducer can
accurately function. The pressure range needed to be sufficiently wide to cover the entire
spectrum of expected pressures while still being fine enough to ensure that there was
adequate precision in the measurements. At the time pressure transducer selection, the
maximum expected operating pressure of the system was set at 100 psi and as a result the
required maximum pressure was set at a mere 200 psi. This and further requirements are
outlined in Table 3.12.
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Table 3.12: Pressure Transducer Requirements
Requirement
Reason
The smaller the pressure range the more precision
the measuring instrument has. Thus the requirement
Pressure range of 0-200 psia
calls for a pressure range that easily contains the
MEOP yet is small enough to remain precise.
The mass of the satellite is limited, and as such all
Lightweight
components must be as light as possible.
As explained previously, the use of similar materials
Stainless steel connections
at connection points will help alleviate the
damaging effects of thermal expansion.

The AS17A model pressure transducer manufactured by Honeywell/Sensotec was
selected for use with the MR SAT propulsion system. While not space qualified, the
AS17A model was developed specifically for aerospace applications and thus is
relatively compact and light. The standard model is capable of reading pressures up to
10,000 psia but can be factory set to read a portion of this range thus increasing the
precision of the measurement. The two pressure transducers for MR SAT were set to an
absolute range of 0 – 200 psia in accordance with the requirements in place at the time.
Specifications for the MR SAT pressure transducers are found in Table 3.13.

Table 3.13: Pressure Transducer Specifications [22]
Pressure range
0 – 200 psia (0 – 1378.96 kPa)
Mass
140 g
Operating temperature range
-54 °C – 121 °C
Casing material
Stainless Steel
Connection type
7/16-20 UNF
Electrical connection
PRIH-10-6P
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3.3.2. Component Arrangement. Component arrangement encompassed two
aspects of system design: the actual order of components within the propulsion system,
i.e. along the propellant lines, and the layout or location of components within the
satellite necessary for integration purposes. The placement of each component, both
within the propulsion system and within the satellite, could not be arbitrary, but rather
had to satisfy a variety of requirements from NS4 guidelines to propulsion system
requirements to even structural requirements for the satellite.
3.3.2.1 Propellant line division. The function of entire propulsion system is to
efficiently transport propellant from the tank to the thruster assemblies in order to
produce thrust. With eight thrusters stemming from a single source tank, the main
propellant line must split into eight branches.

The manner in which this split is

accomplished greatly affects the final layout of the system. Two methods were proposed:
the utilization of a manifold design where the main line is split into eight individual lines
through the use of one fitting and a fitting design which utilized a series of cross and tee
fittings to split the lines to the requisite number.
The manifold design offered many advantages with regard to integration and
performance. The main benefit realized would be the direct routing of propellant lines to
each thruster and the corresponding reduction in connections. Direct routing would
allow, with careful design, the propellant lines to be relatively equal in length and thus
equalize the performance losses associated with wall friction. Uneven line lengths result
in certain lines experiencing greater frictional losses and thus thrusters that could
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experience vastly different performance. Additionally, the propellant losses associated
with connection leak rates would be reduced along with the number of connection points.
Using a series of fittings to divide the branch lines offered a commercial off the
shelf (COTS) option which would meet the requirements and needs of the propulsion
system. Under this plan, the main line would first be divided into three secondary lines
by means of a cross fitting. Five tee fittings are then used to further divide the lines into
tertiary and quaternary lines. The major benefit of this plan is the COTS nature of the
components; however, this comes at the cost of ten extra connection points within the
system and propellant lines of unequal length and complexity.
Time and budgetary constraints lead to the manifold option being downgraded to
a long-term research project. During the NS4 competition research into manifold design
determined that no COTS manifold with eight outlet ports could be sourced. Such a
manifold would have to be custom designed and manufactured to meet the specifications
of the MR SAT propulsion system. While this would be possible, the added time and
inherent expense made this option unsuitable for implementation during the NS4
competition. Therefore, the series of Swagelok fittings was employed as seen in Figure
3.10.
3.3.2.2 Component order.

Each component for the propulsion system was

carefully chosen to meet the requirements set forth by the Propulsion subsystem;
component placement within the propulsion system was just as important to the overall
functionality of the system. With the basic propellant line structure established, the other
components had to be incorporated into the system. Just as the individual specifications
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of each component had to satisfy the requirements of the overall system and the UNP, the
placement of each component had to contribute to the realization of system requirements.
Many of these components required integration before the main line split so that they
were effective for the entire propulsion system. Additionally, the position of components
relative to each other was instrumental to the functionality of certain components.

Figure 3.10: Line Division Using Swagelok Fittings
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The isolation valves are prime examples of components that seemingly could be
placed anywhere within the system as long as program requirements are met; and yet,
must be incorporated prior to the main line division point for efficient design. NS4
guidelines only stipulate that each path of a pressurized system must have three
independent inhibits; however, the placement of isolation valves greatly determines the
number of valves needed to attain the three inhibit status. For example, if only a single
isolation valve is placed along the main line, a total of sixteen valves would have to be
integrated into the branch lines to maintain the three inhibits. Thus by incorporating both
isolation valves on the main line the total number of valves required for the propulsion
system is reduced by seven.
With all the functional components needing to be placed along the main line, the
relative location of each had to be determined. The function of each part was the
determining factor for its location. For instance, the first isolation valve is intended to
isolate the propellant tank from the rest of the system prior to the initiation of formation
flight and as such needs to be close to the tank on the main line. However, the pressure
maintained within the propellant tank needs to be constantly monitored which means one
of the pressure transducers must be placed before the first isolation valve. In the same
way, the final pressure transducer must be located just after the pressure regulator device
or else it would be incapable of determining the regulated pressure. Finally, the line
heater must be placed where the greatest possibility of propellant condensation occurs.
The main concern with regard to propellant condensation was due to long term propellant
storage within the lines. This is unlikely to occur post-regulator, so the line heater was
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integrated just preceding the regulator. Thus combining the layout of the main line with
the line division plan yields the basic order of components given in Figure 3.11.

Figure 3.11: Basic Order of Components for MR SAT Propulsion

3.3.2.3 Naming convention.

Each part and connection must be individually

identifiable and trackable so that torque logs and part logs can be filled out. Such logs
are mandated by UNP and are a method to catalog and document pertinent information
concerning the safety and usability of components throughout their lifetime. Therefore,
a naming convention had to be implemented to distinguish otherwise indistinguishable
parts and connections.
The easiest way to implement a naming convention in a rational and systematic
manner was to base each part name on component type and location along the propellant
line. The first step, then, was to systematically name each branch line. To begin the
process, the line stemming directly from the propellant tank was classified as the Main
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Line. Each secondary line was then numbered starting with the left most line stemming
from the diverging point when seen from above (see Figure 3.12) and continuing
clockwise. Tertiary lines were given a letter beginning with “a” attached to the moniker
of their source line and quaternary lines continued in the same manner utilizing numbers.

Figure 3.12: Example of Line Naming Convention

Parts and tubing were then named based upon the location of said part along each
of the various branch lines. The final name consisted of three parts; one or two letters
identifying component type, line name, and number of that particular component type
along that line.

For example, the tee fitting connecting the downstream pressure

transducer to the main line was cataloged as TML02 where “T” denotes type of fitting,
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“ML” signifies that the fitting is on the main line, and “02" indicates that it is the second
tee fitting on the line. Figure 3.13 depicts each component and its corresponding name
within the propulsion system.
3.3.2.4 System integration. Transforming the two-dimensional basic component
order into a three dimensional system integration plan required consultation with both the
structures and integration subsystems to ensure that the system fit within the confines of
MR SAT and met all requisite structural guidelines. Discussions focused on two key
areas: the integration of the core hardware, i.e. the propellant tank and main line
hardware, and the integration of the thruster assemblies and propellant lines onto the
isogrid panels.
The core hardware represented the majority of the mass and volume of the MR
SAT propulsions system. Its placement was also the initial task for the integration of the
propulsion system into MR SAT beginning with tank placement. Due to the variable
nature of propellant tank mass (i.e. the mass changes as propellant is expelled), the
placement of the tank can affect the motion of the satellite CG during the mission.
Ideally, the CG of the tank would be placed at the CG of the satellite to limit the change
of CG throughout the mission; however, due to the dimensions of the propellant tank and
the placement of other satellite components this was neither practical nor structurally
feasible. Therefore, the tank was placed along the bottom panel of MR SAT with the
inlet and outlet oriented towards opposing corners within the hexagon frame of the
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Figure 3.13: M-SAT Propulsion System Component Names
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satellite. The orientation was particularly important in terms of integration since the
cross corner span of the satellite represents the greatest linear distance along the bottom
panel. Thus, even with specialized fittings attached to the outlet of the propellant tank the
propellant lines still remain within the interior of the satellite.
Stemming from the propellant tank is the main line of the propulsion system. As
originally designed, a specially designed Swagelok elbow fitting immediately directed
the main line from the propellant tank down to the base plate of MR SAT. From there
the line angled in along the side of the tank to a tee fitting connected to the first pressure
transducer. After the first isolation valve, the line bent 90 degrees upward where the
pressure regulator and second pressure transducer were integrated into a tower. Finally,
the line bent another 90 degrees to run along the top panel where the second isolation
valve was incorporated. A CAD model of this set-up is shown in Figure 3.14.
The problem with this arrangement was structural in nature.

The tower of

components had no support structure in place to balance the mass of the components and
prevent launch vibrations from tearing the components apart. Various solutions and
adaptations were proposed that maintained the same basic tower structure yet attempted
to provide the components added support by incorporating support rods or even tying
components into special support structures added to the nearby component boxes within
MR SAT. However, these options were not optimal solutions and the subsystem began
considering entirely new configurations that would be structurally sound.
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Figure 3.14: Early Propulsion Configuration

The challenge of developing a core hardware configuration where all components
have sufficient structural support was one of limited space and attachment points within
the satellite.

With the propellant tank occupying most of the bottom panel and

component boxes limiting the available space along the side panels, the only accessible
space for the main line components is the area directly above the propellant tank. There
were no natural attachment points within this region but a support structure could be
incorporated into the propellant tank mounts that would allow the main line components
to wrap around the tank.
This support structure consisted of two specially designed tank mounts and a
mounting bridge that spans the gap between the two mounts. The tank mounts each had a
contoured opening designed to fit over the hemispheric ends of propellant tank and were
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bolted to the bottom plate of MR SAT. The mounting bracket on the outlet side of the
tank was equipped with two lipped shelves slanted at a downward 45 degree angle.
These shelves were designed to serve as mounting brackets which completely support the
mass of the two pressure transducers. Each tank mount was also fitted with a raised
platform serving as the integration point for the mounting bridge. The mounting bridge
was a thin piece of aluminum with two sets of pronged attachment points stemming from
either side of the bridge. Figure 3.15 represents the developed support structure with the
tank incorporated.

Figure 3.15: Tank and Support Structure

With this support arrangement, the main line is directed upward upon leaving the
tank and angled over into the run end of a tee fitting. Fitted to the branch end of the tee is
the first pressure transducer angled down along the tank mount so that the mass of the
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transducer is supported. From there, the line continues to the first isolation valve which
is supported by two prongs of the mount bridge. The line then wraps around to the other
side of the tank where the pressure regulator is also supported by the mounting bridge.
Next, the line is attached to the branch end of a tee fitting which is angled so that the runs
lay along the sloped supports of the tank mount. The final pressure transducer connects
to the downward angled run of the tee fitting leaving the main line to continue at an
upward angle to the top panel of MR SAT where the final isolation valve is connected
running parallel to the tank. Figure 3.16 represents the core hardware configuration used
for MR SAT with an adaptation of the propellant line between the first isolation valve
and the regulator to provide the four inches of straight tubing required for line heater
integration.
The integration of thruster assemblies and propellant lines into the satellite posed
the same challenges of design encountered during the core hardware configuration. As
discussed earlier in this section, eight thruster assemblies had to be incorporated into the
satellite at specific locations to attain the performance goals of the propulsion system.
Simply integrating the thrusters themselves onto the various isogrid panels would have
been challenging enough given the limited available space; however, the thrusters are not
self contained units and must be connected to propellant lines and fittings which both
require extra space and efficient placement.
Mindful of the integration of other satellite components, the original propellant
line design avoided the center of isogrid panels and limited connections on the top panel
of MR SAT.
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Figure 3.16: MR SAT Core Hardware

In Figure 3.17 the main line continues from the core hardware into a Swagelok cross
fitting on the top panel of MR SAT. From there the three secondary lines diverge along
the edges of the top panel to the second group of diverging points in the form of tee
fittings located along the edges of the isogrid panels. Figure 3.18 shows a close up of
Panel 1 with its four thrusters integrated.
The major difficulty with this routing of propellant lines was the unanticipated
interference the lines and fittings cause in the assembly of the MR SAT structure. In
attempting to avoid component boxes in the center of the panels, the routing plan
inadvertently covered panel attachment points and interfered with bolt patterns. Also,
particularly on Panel 1, the minimum bend radius for the tubing did not allow the

67

propellant lines to avoid interference with component boxes.

Thus a rerouting of

propellant lines was required.

Figure 3.17: Original Propellant Lines Routing

To avoid component and assembly interference, the propellant lines were rerouted
with more of the fittings attached to the top panel. Propellant lines were pulled away
from the isogrid panels in some instances to avoid connection points and account for the
minimum bend radius of the tubing. This was especially true on Panel 1 where the
diverging point was moved off the panel to the top panel of MR SAT and the line
division for the thrusters was changed.
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Figure 3.18: Original Panel 1 Propellant Line Routing

Finally, the corner thrusters were moved from the middle of the corner to one side
so they could be attached to a single panel instead of strung between panels. Figure 3.19
shows the final MR SAT propulsion system.
3.3.3. Expected Performance. Performance is the driving objective of the design
process, and as such a method of objectively determining the performance of the system
as designed was required. Modeling a two-phase system proved to be a difficult task
since the added variables and possibility of condensation quickly complicated the
mathematical equations. Therefore, assumptions were used to simplify the modeling
equations yet still take into account worst-case conditions. A more detailed description
of the modeling process can be found in Section 4.4 of Carl Seubert’s thesis entitled
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“Refrigerant Based Propulsion System for Small Spacecraft;” however, the basic
assumptions and results are listed below.

Figure 3.19: MR SAT Propulsion System Final Design

To employ the rocket flow equations, basic assumptions had to be made. These
include:
•

Isentropic nozzle flow

•

Isothermal fluid in tank and propellant lines

•

Propellant is a gas and obeys the perfect gas law
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•

Nozzle flow is free of discontinuities and/or shockwaves

•

Flow is axially uniform with negligible boundary layer

•

Steady flow with no transient effects due to valve opening/closing

While many of these assumptions are valid given the right operating conditions,
others such as the negligible boundary layer are less valid and must be taken into account
in the form of correction factors applied to the equations. For the final flow conditions, a
pressure loss of 10 psi from regulated pressure (i.e. the nozzle is exposed to a pressure of
14.7 psi) was implemented to account for flow losses due to friction and any leaks
present in the system. Additionally, it was assumed only 90% of the gas pressure could
be effectively converted into thrust with the last 10% being lost to leaks and/or
insufficient pressure to be expelled from the tank. Finally, the propellant temperature
was set to 15 °C which gives a more conservative estimate of thruster performance and
takes into account the possibility that the system heaters may not be able to maintain the
propellant at the target temperature of 20 °C.
Given these conditions, the system performance was computed for three possible
tank pressures. The three pressures chosen account for the sealed container requirement
of NS4 and the advantages that could be realized if higher pressures could be
implemented.

The thrust performance is recorded in Table 3.14 and the system

performance in terms of ΔV is logged in Table 3.15.
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Table 3.14: Predicted Thrust Performance
ISP
43.71 sec
Thrust
37.37 mN
Mass flow rate
0.0889 g/s

Table 3.15: Predicted ΔV Performance for Three Pressure Regimes
Max Tank Pressure
ΔV
Total Thrust Exhaust
at 100 °C (psi)
(m/s)
Duration (min)
100
0.935
11.34
200
2.024
24.52
300
3.345
40.46

3.4. CONCEPTUAL OPERATION
The overall performance of the propulsion system and the satellite as a whole can
depend greatly on how and when various mission tasks are initiated and performed.
Conceptual operations allow for mission planning to take into account multiple mission
conditions and develop contingency plans to deal with suboptimal conditions. While all
operating conditions have not been explored, a basic operation plan for the M SAT
mission has been developed.

The use of the propulsion system within this plan is

discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1. Modes of Operation. The Modes of Operation were developed by the MSAT leadership as a mission timeline to aid in planning. The Modes are a sequence of
major phases within the mission that are further subdivided into general tasks to be
performed by the satellite in order to accomplish the goals of that phase. The entire
mission is divided into 11 major phases with additional safe modes established should
unexpected situations arise. The propulsion system is featured in four of the post-launch
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operation modes including Initialization, Detumble, Separation, and Formation Flight.
However, under nominal conditions, the system will only fire during the Formation Flight
phase of the mission. During both the Initialization and Separation modes, the propulsion
system tasks are limited to monitoring pressure and temperature and ensuring that the
system is prepared to function during the following phase. The propulsion system will
remain on standby during the Detumble mode as a backup system in case the coils cannot
adequately control the satellite; however, should the propulsion system have to be used at
this early junction, the formation flight portion of the mission will be adversely affected
due to the expended propellant.
3.4.2. Stand-by Operations. The major task for the propulsion subsystem when
not engaged in propulsive maneuvers is to maintain the ability of the system to perform
when required.

This involves continually monitoring the system for pressure and

temperature variations and applying active controls in the form of heaters when
applicable. Maintaining the set temperature is particularly important to system function
as the expulsion of propellant from the tank can quickly reduce the temperature of the
propellant to the point where phase change cannot occur and propellant flow would be
interrupted.
3.4.3. Mechanics of Thruster Firing.

There are two ways in which the

propulsion system can be configured to operate during a firing sequence. The first
method has the last two inhibit levels within the propulsion system initially closed.
When a thruster tasking is implemented, both valves are opened, starting with the
isolation valve, in a pulsed fashion allowing propellant to flow down from the regulator
and out the nozzle. The major advantage of this method is that the isolation of the second
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half of the propulsion system is maintained. Thus should a small leak be experienced
downstream of the second isolation valve (where the majority of the connections are), the
propulsion system is not continually feeding propellant to the leaky fitting during long
pauses between firings. However, this method invalidates the assumption of steady flow
since transient conditions would exist in the line due to opening of the valve.
The second has both isolation valves maintained in the open position during
formation flight. To execute a maneuver, therefore, would only require the opening of
the specific thruster or thrusters necessary to produce the required force or torque and
powering up the tank heater to ensure phase transition. Under this method, the propellant
lines downstream of the regulator are kept at a constant pressure in between propulsive
maneuvers and thus the steady flow assumption utilized in the model is more justifiable
as long as sufficient time elapses between thruster firings. Currently, this is the method
set to be used during the MR SAT mission; however, system level testing will determine
the optimal arrangement.
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4. HAZARD ANALYSIS

4.1. PURPOSE
Safety is of the utmost concern when developing and constructing a satellite.
Hazards present serious risks to personnel and equipment, and yet are possible in all
engineered systems.

Identification of all such hazards within a system is the only

possible way to ensure that proper mitigation efforts are in place.

In a two-phase

propulsion system such hazards may be caused by natural thermodynamic events (i.e.
temperature changes due to ambient conditions) or component failures. The hazard
analysis undertaken by the M-SAT Propulsion Subsystem sought to identify the hazards
associated with the system during all phases of construction and operation in order to
ensure

the

mitigation

efforts,

including

component

redesign

and

procedure

implementation, were sufficient to guarantee the safety of all personnel and equipment.
4.2. PROPULSION SAFETY ASSESSMENT WHITE PAPER
The hazard assessment for the MR SAT propulsion system began during the NS4
competition in the form of the Safety Assessment White Paper (SAWP) written jointly by
the three universities pursuing refrigerant based propulsion systems. The Missouri S &
T-led consortium included members of the University of Texas at Austin and the
Washington University in Saint Louis NS4 design teams. The stated purpose of the
SAWP was to lay forth the foundations for a new type of cold gas propulsion based upon
refrigerant propellants stored in a saturated-liquid state. The foundational aspect of the
paper was meant to address concerns of AFRL officials by evaluating the need, design
regime, and safe implementation methods of such a propulsion system.
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4.2.1. Paper Specified Temperature Range. The most extreme temperature and
pressure conditions the propulsion system must be designed to meet will occur on-orbit.
After consultation with the UNP program managers, -50 °C to 100 °C was deemed a
conservative and appropriate range of expected temperatures for nanosatellites in low
Earth orbit.
The conservative nature of the specified range was confirmed in the SAWP
through the analysis of telemetry data collected during various heritage satellite missions.
For example, the AMSAT-OSCAR 7, a 28.6 kg satellite launched into high LEO orbit in
1974, experienced on-orbit temperatures ranging from 8.5 °C to 35.1 °C. Additionally,
the range selected for use in the white paper was found to be more conservative than the
thermal test range (-35 to 75 °C) currently employed by NASA for unmanned spacecraft
[24].
The selection of such a conservative thermal range, particularly the high upper
limit, has a direct impact on the hazard analysis of the system. Given the variable nature
of propellant state within the specified temperature range, worst case scenarios, i.e.
scenarios utilizing the extremes of the range, dominate the analyzed hazards.
4.2.2. Focus of SAWP Hazard Analysis. A typical hazard analysis focuses on
specific physical systems; however, such was not the case with the hazard analysis
associated with the NS4 Propulsion White Paper.

Each member university of the

consortium had designed and was in the process of implementing a unique refrigerantbased propulsion system within their specific satellite. Therefore, it was impossible to
analyze a single propulsion system that would encompass the hazards present in each
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system. Instead, a general system was analyzed for hazards associated solely with the
unique propellant.
Under this guideline, hazards are not associated with a specific component failure,
instead, how a change in the propellant affects the rest of the system is evaluated; e.g., an
increase in propellant pressure could cause the tank to rupture. Due to the somewhat
unspecific nature of the hazards, mitigation efforts described within the SAWP were
presented in the form of design guidelines and suggested practices rather than specific
component remedies.
4.2.3. SAWP Hazard Classification System. To begin the safety assessment, a
hazard classification system was developed based on suggestions from AFRL mentors as
follows:
•

Catastrophic - A Catastrophic Hazard is defined as any single or multiple
system failure which has the potential to cause damage/harm not only to
the spacecraft, but to surrounding equipment/personnel as well.

•

Critical - A Critical Hazard is defined as any system failure which results
in damage/harm to the spacecraft and/or has the potential to negatively
impact mission objectives to the point of failure.

•

Tolerable - A Tolerable Hazard is defined as any system failure which
results in minimal damage to the spacecraft/mission.

Based on these definitions, hazards are classified not by the likelihood of their
occurrence but rather by the ramifications of said occurrence. In this way, identified
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hazards can be ranked on a relative scale, and the impact of each identified; thus enabling
proper design choices to be made.
However, in discounting the probability of hazard occurrence and the possibility
of mitigation efforts, the classification system makes nearly impossible to design and fly
a system free of catastrophic hazards. Thus, the additional classification of Acceptable
Risk for Flight, as designated below, was necessary as justification for the inclusion of
catastrophic hazards within flight-ready designs.
• Acceptable Risk for Flight - Acceptable Risk for Flight is defined as
operating the system with known hazards classified as Tolerable or with
hazards which can be mitigated to tolerable levels by use of the
appropriate safety devices and measures.
4.2.4. SAWP Hazard Analysis. The general design of any propulsion system
contains many possible hazards within each classification. In most cases, propellant is
initially stored in a small, pressurized vessel and from there distributed to the thrusters by
means of tubing. By taking into account mission objectives, a prototype design can be
developed; however, before the design can be further refined, the safety assessment must
be completed to ensure selected components meet the mitigation criteria.
4.2.4.1 Catastrophic hazards. The greatest risk inherent to the system comes
from uncontrolled and unexpected changes in the state of the propellant.

The

catastrophic hazard is directly caused by an increase in system temperature, but may have
many indirect causes. As a result of this increase, the pressure of the propellant could
rise to levels above the maximum design pressure mandated for the system components,
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which in turn could lead to increased leak rates and/or system rupture. The use of storage
tanks defined as pressure vessels greatly amplifies the effects of burst since they contain
enough internal energy to seriously impact the surrounding area. Both passive and active
methods of mitigation are available to combat the adverse effects of pressure increase.
The first passive measure is simply designing the storage vessel with a sufficiently large
factor of safety to withstand any fluctuations within the system. Also, the system should
be designed to be leak-before-burst; thus alleviating dangerous over-pressurization
through low energy fluid discharge rather than an explosive release of energy. The active
method uses sensors to monitor system conditions and discharges the system once
dangerous levels have been reached.
Another consequence of a rise in temperature is encountered within the system
materials. Many materials, metallic in particular, expand and contract with changes in
temperature causing increased stress at connection points.

If these stresses are not

accounted for in the design of the system, increased leak rates and/or rupture could occur.
Additionally, if materials with dissimilar thermal expansion rates are used at connection
points, the possibility of mission damaging leaks increases many fold. Two possible
sources of differing thermal properties are the use of multiple materials (e.g. aluminum
connected to steel) and the existence of thermal gradients between connected
components. To guard against the possible consequences of thermal expansion, proper
material selection must be performed with particular attention to obtaining sufficient
yield and fracture stress properties, and if possible, avoiding the use of dissimilar
materials.
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Finally, under drastic conditions and extreme temperatures, the selected
refrigerants have the added hazard of decomposition and even the possibility of autoignition. Decomposition of R-134a and R-123 occurs at temperatures above 250°C and
auto ignition at or above 743°C and 770°C, respectively. All values are well above the
expected temperature range; however, the seriousness of the consequences produced by
this hazard merits mention. Both refrigerants decompose into highly volatile and caustic
chemicals, such as hydrofluoric acid, which can cause serious burns and compromise
equipment. Care should be taken during construction and storage of the satellite so
propellant does not come into contact with excessive heat such as open flames.
When dealing with pressure vessels, structural strength of the selected material is
of the utmost importance. However, merely designing to worst-case scenarios is no
guarantee of successfully avoiding structural failure since thermal cycling has, in addition
to those risks associated with the corresponding maximum and minimum temperatures,
the potential to cause structural failures due to thermal fatigue. Temperature fluctuations
for a two-phase propellant system can occur due to both system and environmental
influences.

During propulsive maneuvers the endothermic phase change lowers the

overall system temperature. Environmental factors, such as leaving and entering eclipse,
can also cycle system temperatures. To avoid thermal fatigue, it is first necessary to
thermally insulate the system through use of MLI which will greatly reduce the effects of
the spacecraft’s environment.

To reduce the effect of system processes, system

monitoring and some method of energy addition to the system (i.e. heaters) are required.
The heaters should be turned on during propulsive maneuvers to account for endothermic
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phase change and minimize thermal gradients.

Finally, system materials should be

chosen in such a way as to limit the effects of thermal cycling where possible.
4.2.4.2 Critical hazards. Catastrophic hazards may pose the greater threat to
surrounding equipment and personnel; however, critical hazards are no less destructive to
mission success. As with hazards classified as catastrophic, critical hazards are often
products of the propellant state whereas mitigation methods normally center on proper
component selection and procedures.
The effects of a temperature decrease within the system represent a critical hazard
rather than catastrophic as the internal energy contained within the system is far less than
that for the case of temperature increase. As such, the overall magnitude of possible
consequence for any resulting failure is less. This does not mean, however, that thermal
decrease can be ignored. Any substantial decrease in the temperature of the fluid will
result in a phase change. If the temperature falls to the freezing point of the propellant,
the fluid will solidify. The effectiveness of the propulsion system’s internal mechanisms
will be reduced with a potential of damage to internal mechanics of the tank if any of the
solid propellant shifted. However, the system need not reach the propellant freezing
point in order for a hazard to be present since there exists the potential for system
materials to experience reduced structural integrity (brittleness) due to the low
temperatures generated by the fluid.

Also, as with thermal expansion, thermal

contraction can lead to propellant leakage and eventual mission failure if different
contraction rates exist between components. Mitigation efforts should include system
heaters and insulation to lessen the probability of significant temperature decrease. Also,
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system materials should be selected to avoid mismatched thermal contraction rates and
materials which can become brittle within the expected temperature range.
Temperature and pressure are not the only propellant properties to consider during
a hazard analysis; the material compatibility and potential for chemical reactivity are also
a concern. While refrigerants are generally chemically inert, as previously mentioned
there are certain substances with which a negative reaction can occur. Any system
material should be thoroughly researched for its compatibility with the chosen propellant.
System materials which have direct contact with the propellant must have a zero to very
low reactivity rating to ensure continued system functionality. When determining an
acceptable degradation rate, mission length should be accounted for with appropriate
margins. For shorter missions, a somewhat faster reaction rate might be acceptable so
long as mission goals are not negatively impacted; however, longer missions require
much lower reactivity. Materials with no or limited exposure to the fluid under normal
operating conditions must also be considered since any leaks could bring said material in
contact with the propellant. To prevent harm to equipment and personnel, any material
reactions determined to be explosive or combustible require the selection of a different
material. Where material reselection is not possible, such as on board the launch vehicle,
it is important to make sure the system has minimum leakage to lessen the chance of
reaction with an unknown material.
4.2.4.3 Tolerable hazards.

Throughout ground operations, there is the

possibility of exposure to the propellant which is a tolerable hazard that can be avoided.
Direct skin contact can have two results: skin irritation and/or frostbite. Skin irritation is
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a symptom of chemical exposure to the refrigerants, while frostbite results from the low
temperature nature of the refrigerant. Asphyxiation is possible if proper venting is not
present during the discharge of any propellant. Personnel should be required to wear
suitable protective clothing and eyewear. In addition approved ventilation and warnings
should be instituted in the work environments where potential exposure to the propellant
can occur.
4.2.4.4 Hazard classification matrix. The hazard analysis for the SAWP was
put into a classification matrix in order for the identified hazards to easily be classified
and associated with the required mitigation methods. The resulting catalog of hazards is
shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix
Hazard

Classification

Associated Risk

Thermal
Cycling

Catastrophic

Structural failure
of components
(Fatigue and
brittle fracture)

Methods of
Mitigation
Temperature
monitoring
Insulation
Suitable
selection of
system materials
Apply active
thermal controls
(i.e. heaters)
during
propellant
storage

Reclassification
After
Mitigation
Critical
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Hazard
Propellant
Leakage

Table 4.1 SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix (Cont.)
Reclassification
Methods of
Classification Associated Risk
After
Mitigation
Mitigation
Critical
Risks of
Methods for
Tolerable
exposure to
exposure to
propellant:
propellant:
Ground
ground
operations and
operations and
flight materials
flight materials.
Selection of
connections with
minimized leak
rates.

Exposure to
Propellant:
Ground
Operations

Tolerable

Material
Elongation

Critical

Different
Material
Thermal
Expansions
Rates and/or
Thermal
Gradients

Skin irritation
and/or frostbite
Asphyxiation

Critical

Added stress at
connections
Possible leaks
and/or burst
Possible leaks

Selection of
system materials
with appropriate
factor of safety
to ensure a high
leak-beforeburst point.
Post warnings of
exposure hazard
Wear suitable
skin protection
and eyewear and
implement
approved
ventilation
Properly
selecting fittings

Properly select
materials

Tolerable

Tolerable

Tolerable
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Hazard
System
Charge and
Discharge

Unexpected
and
Significant
System
Pressure
Increase

Table 4.1 SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix (Cont.)
Reclassification
Methods of
Classification Associated Risk
After
Mitigation
Mitigation
Critical
Mechanical
Proper selection
Tolerable
fatigue which
of tank materials
leads to possible
and
rupture
minimization of
the number of
charge and
discharge cycles
Catastrophic
Increased leak
Passive
Catastrophic
rates and/or
Methods:
system rupture System designed
with large factor
of safety to
withstand any
pressure
fluctuations.
System designed
to be leak before
burst
Active
Measures:
System
monitoring
through pressure
transducers.

Substantial
Temperatur
e Decrease
Decomp of
Propellant

Critical
Catastrophic

System materials
may become
brittle
Production of
toxic/caustic
chemicals which
can cause
structural
failures and
chemical burns

Release of
propellant to
reduce pressure
Proper selection
of materials
Avoid
temperatures
above 250 C

Tolerable
Catastrophic
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Hazard
Thermal
Increase

Table 4.1 SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix (Cont.)
Reclassification
Methods of
Classification Associated Risk
After
Mitigation
Mitigation
Catastrophic
Risks of system
Methods for
Catastrophic
pressure increase
pressure
increase
Risks of material
elongation
Methods for
material
Risks of
elongation
different thermal
expansion rates
Methods for
and/or thermal
different
gradient
material thermal
expansion rates
Risks of
and/or thermal
decomposition
gradient
Risks of fire
and/or autoignition

Propellant
Freezing

Fire and/or
Autoignition

Critical

Catastrophic

Potential damage
to internal
mechanics of
system
components

Methods for
decomposition
Methods for fire
and/or autoignition
Apply active
thermal controls
(i.e. heaters)
during
propellant
storage

Reduced
effectiveness of
Insulation
internal
mechanics of
Temperature
system
monitoring
Possible fire
Avoid high
with exposure to
temperatures,
high
high
concentrations of concentration of
Oxygen and
Oxygen, ignition
ignition source
sources, and use
proper storage
procedures

Tolerable

Catastrophic
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4.2.4.5 SAWP hazard analysis conclusion.

Ideally speaking, only systems

containing no hazards classified greater than tolerable would be considered for flight;
however, given the nature of spacecraft design, this is not always possible. Since the
classification of a hazard is based not on the likelihood of its occurrence but on the
potential harm the hazard could produce, even after mitigation some hazards cannot be
reclassified. Mitigation efforts can, however, reduce the possibility of such an adverse
event and even lessen the potential harm to both equipment and personnel. To represent
an acceptable risk for flight, all hazards within a system must be acknowledged and
addressed by implementing the proper mitigation methods. Those hazards which cannot
be reclassified do not preclude a system from flight if ground and launch personnel are
aware of the potential danger and can execute the necessary procedures to prevent the
occurrence.
4.2.5. AFRL Approval for the SAWP.

After completion, the SAWP was

presented to AFRL officials for final approval of the document and thus their tacit
approval of the foundations and guidelines within the paper. Two separate levels of
approval were sought by the consortium; approval of concept and approval of design
constraints.

Approval of concept covers the idea that refrigerant based cold gas

propulsion systems are not inherently unsafe and can be implemented under the UNP.
AFRL approval of the design constraints developed in the SAWP would imply that
systems designed within the specifications of the SAWP would meet safety guidelines
and be permitted to fly.
Top level analysis of the SAWP by AFRL officials found the paper to be well
written and reasoned. Thus, AFRL acknowledged the necessity of using two-phase cold
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gas thrusters and that such thruster systems were not innately in violation of UNP
policies. However, final approval for the document was not granted due to lack of
specifics within the design and hazard analysis portions. AFRL safety officials were
looking for assurances within the paper that each propulsion system had been designed
and implemented in a safe manner.
assurances were impossible.

Due to the general nature of the paper such

Additionally, safety officials took exception to the

“Acceptable Risk for Flight” definition; stating that catastrophic hazards are generally not
acceptable flight risks and that mitigation efforts or design changes are necessary to
remove said hazards from the system.
4.3. SCOPE OF HAZARD ANALYSIS
Addressing the concerns of AFRL officials in terms of the M SAT propulsion
system required a shift in focus away from the previous consortium of universities and
toward a system tailored hazard analysis. The analysis must strive to discover, classify,
and correct all potential hazards to personnel and equipment. As such, the analysis
cannot merely be based upon hazards present in the final product, but also must take into
account hazards present during all phases of construction and operation.
Therefore, the second hazard analysis undertaken by the M SAT Propulsion
subsystem sought to identify and mitigate hazardous situations during all phases of
design, construction, and operation with particular attention to possible situations which
could lead to catastrophic hazards later on in the mission timeline.
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4.4. TYPES OF HAZARD ANALYSIS
Multiple hazard analysis methodologies were explored for possible adaptation to
the needs of the M SAT Propulsion hazard analysis. The methods researched basically
fell into one of two categories: a “What if?” method where the analysis is performed by
determining the consequence of the realization of component failure modes and a more
quantitative analysis based upon the given rate of component failure and the effect of said
failure upon system operation.
The quantitative analysis has the benefit of being a far more thorough analysis
method that utilizes manufacturer’s component failure rates to determine the probability
of hazard occurrence. Additionally, the consequences of the hazard on the system are
quantitatively described through simulation; thus, allowing for the quantitative
assignment of severity levels. The major drawback of such an analysis is its time and
labor intensive nature. While not as thorough as the more quantitative analysis, the
“What if” type of analysis has the major benefit of low personnel cost. As both time and
personnel are legitimate concerns for the M SAT team, a “What if” style hazard analysis
was deemed adequate for the purposes of the M SAT Propulsion subsystem.
4.5. DEFINING A HAZARD CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
The shortfall of the previous classification system was that it failed to take into
account the probability of hazard occurrence and thus limited the manners in which
catastrophic hazards could be addressed. Therefore, a new system of classification that
still accounted for hazard severity yet also incorporated hazard probability was required.
At the suggestion from SAWP reviewers, inspiration for the new classification system
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was drawn

from

NASA and

DOD documents concerning

hazard

analysis

implementation.
Under the new system, the measure of severity definitions remain relatively
unchanged. Four severity classifications are defined in Table 4.2.

Description
Catastrophic

Critical

Marginal

Negligible

Table 4.2. Hazard Severity Classifications [25]
Category
Environmental, Safety, and Health Result Criteria
I

Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmental
damage that violates law or regulation.

II

Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or
occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at
least three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but less than
$1M, or reversible environmental damage causing a
violation of law or regulation.

III

Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in
one or more lost work days(s), loss exceeding $10K but
less than $200K, or mitigatible environmental damage
without violation of law or regulation where restoration
activities can be accomplished.

IV

Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost work
day, loss exceeding $2K but less than $10K, or minimal
environmental damage not violating law or regulation.

Probability of occurrence was taken into account by implementing a secondary set
of classifications indicating the frequency the hazardous situation is likely to occur.
These definitions are given in Table 4.3.
The two classifications are then combined within a Risk Assessment Matrix
(RAM) to yield the Risk Assessment Code (RAC) associated with each hazard. The
RAM used for the MR SAT Propulsion hazard analysis is detailed in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Probability Estimate Classification [25]
Description
Category
Applicable Criteria
Likely to occur often during the operational lifetime
Frequent
A
of the system, with a probability of occurrence
greater than 10-1 in that life.
B

Will occur several times during the operational
lifetime of the system, with a probability of
occurrence less than 10-1 but greater than 10-2 in that
life.

Occasional

C

Likely to occur sometime during the operational
lifetime of the system, with a probability of
occurrence less than 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in that
life.

Remote

D

Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item,
with a probability of occurrence less than 10-3 but
greater than 10-6 in that life.

Probable

Catastrophic
Critical
Marginal
Negligible

Table 4.4: Risk Assessment Matrix
Frequent
Probable
Occasional
1
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
4
3
3
4

Remote
3
3
4
4

The different RACs attached to each identified hazard speak to the flight
acceptability of said hazard. The definitions for RACs 1-4 are as follows:
• RAC 1 – The hazard presents an imminent danger and unacceptable risk
for flight. Mitigation efforts must be implemented (preferably in the form
of a redesign) to reduce hazard severity and probability.
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• RAC 2 – The hazard presents a serious danger to surrounding equipment
and personnel.

The hazard is an unacceptable risk for flight and

mitigation efforts must be implemented.
• RAC 3 – The hazard is an acceptable flight risk yet should be addressed
with applicable mitigation procedures if possible.
• RAC 4 – The hazard is an acceptable flight risk with current controls.
4.6. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Hazard identification is an important step in the analysis process. To begin the
process of hazard identification, the failure modes of each component within the system
were delineated. Any event, defect, or deviation from nominal component performance
which has the potential to adversely affect mission goals or cause dangerous situations is
deemed a failure mode of said component. For example, the elbow fitting attached to the
propellant tank has two identified failure modes: component leak and component burst.
However, to account for hazards not associated merely with component failure, the
identification process was extended to the different phases of the propulsion project
beginning with the construction phase. Within the various phases of the project, the
hazards present are mainly procedural in nature rather than component related. To
identify these hazards, the procedures were analyzed for hazardous situations and
potential errors in implementation which could result in future hazards.
4.7. HAZARD ANALYSIS
With hazards present within the system identified, the analysis portion of the
process begins. Each identified failure mode was examined as to the circumstances
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which could lead to the occurrence of said failure mode. The probability of hazard
occurrence was then assessed by analyzing the pertinent data such as Factors of Safety
and available data on component failure rates. Finally, the consequences of occurrence
were evaluated and described in order to judge the severity classification necessary for
the failure mode.
The next step in the analysis process was the assignment of the initial Risk
Assessment Code for each identified hazard based on the method described in Section
4.5. Finally, controls and mitigation efforts were considered and the RAC adjusted to
correspond with the new severity and probability classifications. The resulting hazard
analysis can be found in the appendix.
4.8. MITIGATION: DESIGN VS. PROCEDURE
When confronting a possible hazard, the primary goal of the system designer
should be to eliminate the hazard through a redesign process or implement automatic
controls within the system that remove the probability of hazard occurrence.

This

provides the safest means for continued operation of the system; however, under certain
circumstances the hazard cannot be wholly removed from the system and in such
instances procedures must be implemented to mitigate the risk.
4.9. HAZARD ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS
The completed hazard analysis for the M SAT propulsion system demonstrates
the inherent safety of the system. As designed, or with the implementation of proper
handling procedures, all identified possible hazards within the system merit risk
assessment codes deemed acceptable for flight.
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5. SYSTEM-LEVEL TESTING

5.1. INTRODUCTION
Complex systems must undergo a multitude of tests in order to be certified ready
for flight. Testing begins at the component level; with each component undergoing
extensive evaluations to ensure that the expected performance characteristics are
achieved. At the same time, small conceptual tests are performed at the subsystem level
to explore the pertinent theory utilized by the system. However, the system cannot be
certified as ready without full system-level testing that confirms the expected
performance. Such testing must be conducted in a manner as close as possible to the
conditions in which the system will normally operate so as to identify performance
deviations and to verify system function.
5.2. SYSTEM-LEVEL TEST GOALS
The MR SAT propulsion system embodies an innovative approach to small
satellite propulsion, and as such the theoretical work performed for the design process
must be confirmed.

The key performance parameters still in need of physical

demonstration for the refrigerant based system include the performance of the integrated
PMD, the ability of the system to maintain the necessary tank temperature, and the
overall thruster performance of the system. These three physical traits of the system are
interconnected in such a manner that they must be explored in unison for useful
information to be determined. The goal then, for system-level testing, is to develop a
testing platform capable of monitoring and testing each of these functions.
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5.3. REDUCED GRAVITY STUDENT FLIGHT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM
Under normal laboratory conditions it is difficult and perhaps impossible to
accurately determine the successful operation of the integrated PMD since slosh effects
occur only in micro gravity conditions. Therefore, it was necessary to secure laboratory
facilities that could mimic the micro gravity environment in which the propulsion system
would normally operate.
The Reduced Gravity Student Flight Opportunity Program (RGSFOP) is a NASA
program in which university-presented research projects can secure flight time on NASA
aircraft used to simulate micro gravity conditions. The program begins in late September
or early October with the submission of a research proposal by university group or design
team seeking a flight berth. In December, approximately 40 university teams are selected
for flights during the first half of the following year.
The C-9 aircraft used for the program flies a series of parabolas between 20,000
and 35,000 feet. As the aircraft flies over the crest of the flight pattern, approximately 30
seconds of micro gravity occur during which experiments can be run. As the aircraft
pulls out of the dive, a period of twice normal gravity is experienced. Each experiment
receives two flights per flight week with approximately 30 parabolas of micro gravity
encountered per flight.
5.4. TEST APPARATUS
With regard to the design of the testing apparatus, the intent was to develop a
platform capable of supporting and conducting the proposed RGSFOP experiment and
also supporting any future expanded testing plans. With this in mind, the platform was
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designed as a freestanding workstation incorporating the safety and measuring equipment
necessary to perform the testing operations within the various experiment environments.
5.4.1. Measuring Equipment. The propulsion system developed for the satellite
inherently incorporates two pressure transducers in order to monitor the tank pressure and
regulated pressure of the system during spaceflight. In order to augment the information
gathering capabilities, two thermal-couples were added to the propulsion system: one
placed directly at the tank outlet and one within the propellant lines just prior to the
thruster. Rounding out the measuring equipment is a single force transducer capable of
measuring forces from 0 to 50 millinewtons positioned on the air bearing slide to directly
measure thruster performance.
5.4.2. Testing Platform Structural Design. As the experiment was to be flown
on board NASA’s “Weightless Wonder” aircraft, the experiment structure had to be
constructed to the specifications outlined by the RGSFO program. The experiment must
be able to withstand the g-loading requirements found in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Experiment Loading Requirements
Direction
Loading Requirement
Forward
9g
Aft
3g
Upward
2g
Downward
6g
Lateral
2g
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The structural design of the experiment was kept very simple. A base cart was
constructed out of 2 inch by 1/8th inch thick aluminum angle welded into a rectangular
frame. Aluminum plate 1/8th inch thick was then welded to the frame to form the top and
bottom shelf and work area. While in Houston, significant concerns were discovered
with the quality of the structural welds.

Therefore, to add greater strength to the

structure, triangular gussets were bolted to the corners of the base cart.
To contain the expelled propellant and prevent any leaks into the aircraft cabin, a
containment box was developed. The upper frame of the box was constructed from 1
inch aluminum angle with 1 inch square tubing used as cross bracing. The bottom rim of
the containment box was fabricated from 2 inch aluminum angle and fitted with 12 bolts
to allow for the attachment of the containment box to the base cart. The sides and top of
the containment box were enclosed using 3/8 inch thick Lexan bolted to the upper frame
and sealed with silicone. With this configuration, the propulsion system is bolted directly
to the base cart with the containment box fitting over the top of it. Testing Apparatus
shows a diagram of the experimental set-up.
5.4.3. Experiment Electronics Design.

Controlling the experiment and

monitoring the various sensing devices required the development of a computer interface
for the experiment. The interface between the control/monitoring equipment and the
computer was handled by means of a Data Acquisition (DAQ) board. The DAQ board
allowed the computer, using a custom designed LabVIEW program, to operate the two
solenoid valves as well as the two resistive heaters within the system. Utilizing the same
program and DAQ system, the computer is also able to monitor and record the data from
both temperature and pressure sensors as well as the force transducer.
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The power for the system is isolated from the aircraft by means of a Universal
Power Supply (UPS). The isolation is necessary to prevent aircraft power fluctuations
from interfering with the experiment or computer operations. The UPS battery will
charge off aircraft power and in turn power the computer and experiment. Small power
supplies housed in the same box as the DAQ board provide the various voltages
necessary for experiment operation. A diagram of the testing platform can be found in
Figure 5.1.
5.5. TEST DESCRIPTION
Accomplishing the testing goals set forth in Section 5.2 required a testing
platform and experiment design capable of monitoring all aspects of system performance.
Toward that end, a two-phase testing plan was developed that utilized a slightly modified
propulsion system in both ground and microgravity environments.
The modifications to the propulsion system were implemented both to expand the
information gathering capabilities of the experiment and simplify the overall testing
procedures. In addition to the two thermal couples discussed above, other modifications
include the removal of one isolation valve and the use of a single thruster as opposed to
the full complement of eight. Also, a length of flexible tubing was inserted into system to
prevent the stiffness of the metallic tubing from distorting the force data collection.
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Figure 5.1: Testing Apparatus

The basic goal of the ground-based testing is to assess the thermodynamic
properties of the system as well as provide a base-reading of system performance to
compare to later testing data. For this test, a single thruster is fitted into an aluminum
slide on the air bearing and in contact with the sensing lever of a force transducer. The
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system is pressurized with R-134a propellant to the level equivalent which would used on
orbit for the satellite. The thruster will be fired in a variety of patterns to simulate
situations which could occur on orbit. This testing will determine the validity of the
theoretical analysis performed on the system as well as allow for the optimal running
conditions and equipment settings for the system to be determined. Of particular interest
is the recovery time necessary for the heater to overcome the temperature drop associated
with the release of propellant. The target temperature for the heating system and the
pattern of heater use can be varied to determine the best settings for use.
The flight testing is an extension of ground testing merely changing the apparent
gravity on the system. The flight will be used to verify the functionality of the PMD
device within the tank and thus complete the final goal of system level testing. The
testing procedure utilized during flight will be exactly the same as on the ground to
provide an equivalent comparison for performance. Flight data will be compared to
ground data to determine whether or not a detrimental effect on system performance is
present during the microgravity testing. Such a detrimental effect would indicate the
failure of the internal PMD.
5.6. TEST RESULTS
Unfortunately, the test conducted in June of 2008 failed to produce results due to
equipment failure. Prior to the microgravity flights, a design flaw within the DAQ box
caused a continuous 24 volts of electricity to be delivered to both the isolation valve and
the thruster valve. Consequently, both solenoids failed within the isolation valve and
were damaged beyond repair. At the time, the specific flaw within the electronic system
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could not be ascertained; therefore, all electronics within the system were suspect and
could not be used within the experiment.
Given the situation, the experiment was quickly reworked to test the functionality
of the experiment platform itself; specifically the air bearing system.

Testing on the

aircraft confirmed that the air bearing system did not noticeably reduce friction along the
slide. Therefore, it is unlikely that useful force data would have been obtained even
without the electrical failure. Possible suggested causes for the inadequate performance
of the air bearing include material galling and insufficient manufacturing methods.
Galling is a form of surface damage that can occur when two like metals contact in a
sliding manner. Such surface damage increases friction and can prevent smooth sliding.
While both the slide and guide tubing were made of aluminum 6061, and thus susceptible
to galling, the nitrogen expelled by the air bearing should have prevented material contact
and thus surface damage. The more likely cause stems from the design and manufacture
of the air bearing itself. For an air bearing to be effective, the gas flow along the length
of the track must be constant and even over the entire length. Such was not the case with
the MIS air bearing due to an uneven distribution of the holes and their diameter. The
uneven gas flow prevented the slide from moving freely along the guide tubing and thus
prevent accurate force data from being collected.
5.7. FUTURE TEST REQUIREMENTS
The testing platform developed for the RGSFOP experiment is the foundation on
which future system level testing can be conducted. However, minor modifications must
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first be made to the design in order to improve functionality. Specifically, the problems
with the air bearing system need to be addressed.
Air bearings are precision devices; dependant on a multitude of design details
such as hole pattern, slide weight, gas pressure, hole size, etc. to garner the expected
performance. While an in-house design is certainly still an option, given the complex
nature of such a design and the difficulties inherent in manufacturing to the necessary
tolerances, a better use of time and team resources might be to procure a commercial air
bearing system. Alternatively, research into other methods of friction reduction, such as a
magnetic track system, or methods of force measuring which do not rely on the thruster
moving could be conducted in order to address the issue and implement a functional
device.
With the minor modifications discussed above, the initial experiment can be run
on future RGSFOP flights. Afterword, the experiment can be modified and the testing
platform updated to control and monitor multiple thrusters in order to determine the
change in system performance as multiple thrusters are fired. The effect of different
propellant line configurations on thruster performance and different firing patterns can
also be tested.
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6. CONCLUSION

6.1. SUMMARY
As the M-SAT team transitions from the NS4 competition into NS6 and beyond,
it is more important than ever to document not only the intricacies of design associated
with the current system, but also the design and thought processes that directly and
indirectly led to the final propulsion system.

The research described in this thesis

expands upon prior works while focusing on the design process used to develop the MSAT propulsion system.

The design process described flowed from the mission

requirements and program restrictions down through component-level requirements and
resulted in a system capable of performing the assigned duties. While future systems
may face vastly different design and mission requirements, the example set forth by the
NS4 system and the design process used can serve as a starting point for such endeavors.
The hazard analysis conducted for this paper also expanded on previous analyses
to address key issues and AFRL concerns. The analysis showed the system to be safe for
personnel and equipment as designed. Since the design may change and future systems
will be developed, the methodology behind the analysis was also included to serve as a
reference for future hazard analyses.
Finally, a propulsion test platform was developed to address the few remaining
physical and theoretical performance questions remaining. While the platform has yet to
produce the necessary results, minor modifications are being implemented to ensure that
the testing platform is operational and producing results in the near future. The research
conducted with this platform will focus on confirming the theoretical model for thruster
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performance. Additional testing will focus on the thermodynamic aspect of the system to
determine how thruster firing affects the system properties and at what frequency the
thrusters can be cycled while maintaining heater effectiveness. Testing can then be
expanded to include multiple thrusters in order to determine the effect such situations
have on overall system performance.
6.2. FUTURE WORK
While the propulsion design for the NS4 Satellite met the mission requirements, it
was a first-generation design with much room for further improvement.

Design

compromises due to time and other constraints plus overall inexperience with satellite
propulsion design has left several areas within the design where modifications could
potentially improve performance.
The first major design change which could significantly improve mission
performance involves attaining control along the final translational axis. As discussed
previously, a design constraint on thruster placement within the satellite was the desire to
minimize the complexity and cost of the design by minimizing the number of thrusters
used.

However, the additional control axis would allow the satellite to avoid the

necessity of the ninety degree attitude rotation at the onset of formation flight and thus
preserve propellant and extend the formation flight duration. Therefore, a new thruster
configuration that offers control of all translational and rotational axes should be
researched and implemented. A traditional 12 thruster pattern could be implemented
assuming the configuration avoids interference with both the Lightband on bottom of MR
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SAT and the docking interface of MRS SAT on top and limits propellant contamination
along the solar panels.
Another area of possible modification, particularly considering the likely changes
in MR SAT structure and configuration due to NS6 requirements, is the running and
division of propellant lines within the satellite. Currently, the main line is divided into
the various sub-lines by means of standard fittings; however, it has been suggested that a
manifold design could simplify the running of propellant lines and reduce the number of
connection points within the system. This last point is particularly important given that
leaks are a common cause of losses within cold gas propulsion systems. Integration
could also be simplified as fittings would no longer need to be attached to the side panels
for support and propellant lines could be routed directly to the thruster. A trade study
should be conducted utilizing both theoretical and experimental loss data as well as
integration considerations to determine the possible benefits associated with such a
design change.
These modifications should improve propulsion system performance and allow
the current system to be adapted into any NS6 satellite design.
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APPENDIX
Hazard NumberProp-001
Hazard Name Propellant Tank Rupture

Final RAC

3

Part Name

Tk01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Catastrophic

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Propellant tank rupture is caused by the structural failure of the tank. The most likely reason for
such an occurrence is the propellant pressure exceeding the yield point of the tank material.

Consequences

The rupture of the propellant tank would be an extremely dangerous situation. It involves the
spontaneous and sudden release all propellant stored within the propellant tank. The force of such
a release could severely damage nearby equipment (including satellite and launch vehicle
equipment) and cause injury or death to personnel.

Probability

The probability of propellant tank rupture within the MR SAT propulsion system is considered
remote. This is mainly due to the limited propellant mass which is to be stored within the tank. At
the 100 psi equivalent point, a FOS greater than 14 is achieved with regard to the theoretical Burst
Pressure (1421 psi) for the Marrotta tank and a FOS greater than 2 exists with regard to proof
pressure (235 psi). At the maximum operational pressure being considered (307 psi) a FOS of
greater than 4 is still achieved.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Maintaining the factors of safety within the propellant tank requires that the specified propellant
mass be added to the tank. Filling procedures have been developed that incorporate mass
measuring equipment to ensure the correct propellant mass is added. These procedures will be
implemented each time the propellant tank is charged with propellant. Each step of the filling
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to
ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Catastrophic

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

106

Hazard NumberProp-002
Hazard Name Propellant Tank Leak

Final RAC

3

Part Name

Tk01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

A leak from the propellant tank could be caused by two possible failures. The first failure involves
the yielding of the tank material in a manner that allows propellant to slowly be expelled from the
pressurized tank. The second failure involves the inadequate tightening of the fittings on the inlet
and outlet end of the tank.

Consequences

A leak of the propellant from the tank during flight would immediately put the successful
completion of mission objectives in jeopardy due to lack of sufficient propellant to complete
maneuvers. Additionally, leaked propellant could interact with nearby materials to the detriment of
said materials. Finally, should the leak occur during testing or loading, nearby personnel could be
exposed to R-134a which can cause skin irritation, frost-bite, or asphyxiation in enclosed areas.

Probability

The first failure mode is considered unlikely due to the factory testing performed by Marrotta UK
(leak test performed using He and proof tested to 16 bar) and due to the high factors of safety
within the system. The second failure mode is considered more likely to occur if sufficient assembly
procedures and quality assurance policies are not implemented.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Maintaining the factors of safety within the propellant tank requires that the specified propellant
mass be added to the tank. Filling procedures have been developed that incorporate mass
measuring equipment to ensure the correct propellant mass is added. These procedures will be
implemented each time the propellant tank is charged with propellant. Each step of the filling
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to
ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard Numberprop-003
Hazard Name Special Elbow Fitting Material Yield

Final RAC

3

Part Name

ESML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the material of the special elbow fitting to experience yield, the pressure seen by the fitting
would have to greatly exceed the specified ranges for this mission.

Should the material of the special elbow fitting yield, at minimum the resulting propellant loss
would put the successful completion of mission objectives in doubt. Additionally, damage could
occur to surrounding equipment and personnel should the release of propellant result in shrapnel or
flying parts.

Probability

The Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the propellant tank. (~4000 psig)
Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard Numberprop-004
Hazard Name Special Elbow Fitting Leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

ESML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most obvious cause for a loss of propellant stemming from the special elbow is the improper
tightening at the connection points of the fitting.

Leaks both small and large at this point of the system will have detrimental effects on the
performance of system objectives. Leaks stemming from such a cause would not have the explosive
nature of a rupture and as such are less likely to cause damage. However, leaking propellant could
increase risk of asphyxiation and propellant reactions with nearby materials.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-005
Hazard Name TML01 leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

TML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The most probable cause for a loss of propellant stemming from the first Swagelok Tee fitting is the
improper tightening at the connection points of the fitting. Additionally, the manufacturing of
tubing connection also can have an effect on the connection point since for a proper seal to develop
the tubing needs to have a smooth, flat end.

Consequences

A leak at this point in the system, even a small one, could alter the reading of the attached pressure
transducer and thus hamper the monitoring of propellant tank pressure. Also, any loss of propellant
reduces the chances of mission success.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

Ensuring the tubing connected to the Tee fitting is correctly manufactured with flat and smooth
ends.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-006
Hazard Name TML01 Rupture

Final RAC

3

Part Name

TML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A leak at this point in the system, even a small one, could alter the reading of the attached pressure
transducer and thus hamper the monitoring of propellant tank pressure. Additionally, a rupture
could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further hazards.
Finally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.

Probability

The Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the propellant tank. (~4000 psig)
Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-007
Hazard Name CpML01 Leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

CpML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

As with all fittings the most likely cause of a leak is an improper connection.

Leaks both small and large at this point of the system will have detrimental effects on the
performance of system objectives. Additionally, leaking propellant could increase risk of
asphyxiation and propellant reactions with nearby materials.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-008
Hazard Name CpML01 Rupture

Final RAC

3

Part Name

CpML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A leak at this point in the system, even a small one, could alter the reading of the attached pressure
transducer and thus hamper the monitoring of propellant tank pressure. Additionally, a rupture
could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further hazards.
Finally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.

Probability

The Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the propellant tank. (~4000 psig)
Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-009
Hazard Name CpML01 Bending/Crimping

Final RAC

4

Part Name

CpML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

2

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The two sections of the coupling are connected by a very narrow (1/16" OD) tubing which can easily
be bent if excessive stress is placed upon it during assembly (tightening of fittings)

Consequences

A bending of the tubing could cause the tubing to crimp which would cut off the attached pressure
transducer from the system. Without the pressure transducer reading tank conditions could not be
monitored which could increase the subsequent risk of hazards.

Probability

The delicate nature of the connecting tubing means that it is very susceptible to being bent. If too
much stress is applied to the tubing during the assembly process the tubing will bend and possibly
crimp.

Physical
Mitigation

Should a bend occur during the assembly process a new part will be substituted for the damaged
part.

Procedural
Mitigation

The assembly procedures for this connection are designed to minimize the force placed upon the
tubing by isolating the tubing during the tightening process with the aid of a vice. Each step of the
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to
ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-010
Hazard Name PtML01 electrical failure

Final RAC

4

Part Name

PtML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The pressure transducers require specific voltages and power levels to maintain proper function.
The electrical conditioning could be altered by flaws in the circuitry or problems with the connecting
wires.

Should the electronics of the first pressure transducer fail, the tank pressure would remain
unmonitored for the duration of the mission. This could allow a potentially hazardous situation to
go unnoticed and have detrimental effects on the mission.

Probability

The possibility of an electrical failure cannot be entirely discounted; however, such defects can be
detected during testing in a safe manner. Therefore, the probability of electrical failure causing a
dangerous situation is considered remote.

Physical
Mitigation

The boards will be designed in such a way that the pressure transducers receive the power levels
they need to accurately record the tank pressure.

Procedural
Mitigation

In order to prevent a possible hazard, the electronics connected to the pressure transducers will be
thoroughly tested prior to charging the tank. Any and all defects or discrepancies will be recorded
and reported to the proper authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-011

Final RAC

Hazard Name PtML01 Burst

Part Name

4 (for 100 psi)
PtML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification

??

RAC

??

Hazard Analysis

Causes

For the pressure transducer to burst, the material (stainless steel) of the outer casing would have to
yield. Over pressurization could trigger material yield.

Consequences

A rupture of the first pressure transducer would release most of the stored propellant and therefore
ruin any chance of mission success. Also, such a release of energy could cause damage to nearby
equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.

Probability

The pressure transducers (both first and second) used for the MR SAT propulsion system are of a
type rated to pressures up to 10000 psig. However, due to the restrictions on tank pressure both
transducers were calibrated for a maximum pressure of 200 psi to give better precision to the
instrument. It is unknown at this time if pressures greater than 200 psi would destroy the
transducers and present a hazardous situation. Therefore, the current probability rating is unknown
for pressures greater than 200 psi. For the 100 psi operating pressure the FOS of 2 makes the
possibility of burst remote.

Physical
Mitigation

If tank pressure greater than 100 psi are to be used for the MR SAT propulsion system, a new
pressure transducer may need to be procured to monitor tank pressure.

Procedural
Mitigation

Currently, the system is only safe at the 100 psi level. Therefore, proper filling procedures must be
adhered to in order to ensure the safety of surrounding personnel and equipment. Such filling
procedures have been developed and will be implemented in a step by step manner. Each step of
the procedures will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance observer.
Any deviations will be reported to the appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Remote
Probability
Classification (100 psi)

RAC

4
(100 psi)
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Hazard NumberProp-012
Hazard Name VML01 stuck closed

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for an isolation valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical
problem preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the
24 volt pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

With the first isolation valve stuck in the closed position, formation flight is unachievable. However,
there is not a potential risk of injury or further equipment damage associated with this failure mode.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-013
Hazard Name VML01 Locked Open

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

With the valve stuck in the open position, the tank's isolation from the rest of the system is lost
along with one of the three system inhibits. This is not directly detrimental to mission objectives as
the first isolation valve is to remain open throughout the period of formation flight anyway;
however, the lack of isolation of the tank prior to the start of formation flight increases the
probability of propellant loss due to connection leakage (as the propellant is exposed to more
connections).

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to achieve nominal operation will
be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-014
Hazard Name VML01 Clogged

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the isolation valves are extremely narrow and easily clogged with foreign
material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the construction process such
as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve is likely to be a
frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-015
Hazard Name VML01 Burst

Final RAC

3

Part Name

VML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

For the isolation valve to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its
yield pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

Consequences

A rupture of the first isolation valve would release most of the stored propellant and therefore ruin
any chance of mission success. Also, such a release of energy could cause damage to nearby
equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is
greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to
over heating is also considered a remote possibility based upon the expected temperature range for
the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to
function properly at temperatures greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-016
Hazard Name VML01 leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the first isolation valve is improper
tightening of the Swagelok connections.

A leak from the first isolation valve would cause a serious loss of propellant and could be
detrimental to mission goals.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-017
Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-018
Hazard Name RML01 burst

Final RAC

3

Part Name

RML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The rupture of the pressure regulator would be caused by an over pressurization of the system
which results in material yield.

Should the material of the pressure regulator yield, at minimum the resulting propellant loss would
put the successful completion of mission objectives in doubt. Additionally, damage could occur to
surrounding equipment and personnel should the release of propellant result in shrapnel or flying
parts.

Probability

The inlet portion of the pressure regulator is rated to 1000 psi. Therefore at the 100 psi equivalent
mark a FOS of 10 exists. At the maximum pressure being considered for the system (307 psi) a FOS
of 3.25 is maintained. Therefore, material yield is considered a remote possibility.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-019
Hazard Name RML01 leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

RML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the pressure regulator is improper
tightening of the Swagelok connections.

Assuming the first isolation valve remains closed (and holds seal) until the beginning of formation
flight, a small leak at this point of the system would not prevent the implementation of formation
flight, but could drastically reduce the duration which formation flight can be held. A major leak
would prevent formation flight being maintained for any meaningful duration.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-020
Hazard Name RML01 Failure to Regulate Pressure

Final RAC

4

Part Name

RML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The pressure regulator is preset at the factory to a specific outlet pressure. For the regulator to fail
to reduce outlet pressure, the internal mechanism of the regulator would have to fail.

With out the benefit of pressure regulation, the remainder of the system would be exposed to the
pressure remaining in the tank. The exposure would not likely result in problems as all system
components are rated to withstand the full system pressure. However, the loss of regulation could
have a detrimental effect on system performance as the thrust produced by the nozzles would
continually be changing as the tank pressure is reduced.

Probability

The possibility of a factory defect is considered remote.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible in this case.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of the pressure regulator will be conducted. Any deviations from nominal
operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

125

Hazard NumberProp-021
Hazard Name TML02 leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

TML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most probable cause for a loss of propellant stemming from the second Swagelok Tee fitting is
the improper tightening at the connection points of the fitting. Additionally, the manufacturing of
tubing connection also can have an effect on the connection point since for a proper seal to develop
the tubing needs to have a smooth, flat end.
With the tee placed after the first isolation valve, a leak stemming from it will not cause major
propellant loss before the beginning of formation flight (assuming the valve seal is maintained).
However, any loss of propellant reduces the possible duration of the formation flight phase, and the
pressure loss associated with the leak would disrupt the readings of the second pressure transducer
and affect the monitoring of the regulated pressure.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-022
Hazard Name TML02 Rupture

Final RAC

3

Part Name

TML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further
hazards. Additionally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-023
Hazard Name CpML02 Leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

CpML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

Consequences

Given that the fitting in question is after the first isolation valve, propellant loss stemming from a
leak at this point of the system would not occur until formation flight had been engaged. However,
a leak would limit the ability of the second pressure transducer to monitor regulated pressure and
would reduce the time available for formation flight.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-024
Hazard Name CpML02 Rupture

Final RAC

3

Part Name

CpML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further
hazards. Additionally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-025
Hazard Name CpML02 Bending/Crimping

Final RAC

4

Part Name

CpML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

2

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The two sections of the coupling are connected by a very narrow (1/16" OD) tubing which can easily
be bent if excessive stress is placed upon it during assembly (tightening of fittings)

Consequences

A bending of the tubing could cause the tubing to crimp which would cut off the attached pressure
transducer from the system. Without the pressure transducer reading tank conditions could not be
monitored which could increase the subsequent risk of hazards.

Probability

The delicate nature of the connecting tubing means that it is very susceptible to being bent. If too
much stress is applied to the tubing during the assembly process the tubing will bend and possibly
crimp.

Physical
Mitigation

Should a bend occur during the assembly process a new part will be substituted for the damaged
part.

Procedural
Mitigation

The assembly procedures for this connection are designed to minimize the force placed upon the
tubing by isolating the tubing during the tightening process with the aid of a vice. Each step of the
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to
ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

130

Hazard NumberProp-026
Hazard Name PtML02 electrical failure

Final RAC

4

Part Name

PtML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The pressure transducers require specific voltages and power levels to maintain proper function.
The electrical conditioning could be altered by flaws in the circuitry or problems with the connecting
wires.

Should the electronics of the second pressure transducer fail, the regulated pressure would remain
unmonitored for the duration of the mission. This could allow a potentially hazardous situation to
go unnoticed and have detrimental effects on the mission.

Probability

The possibility of an electrical failure cannot be entirely discounted; however, such defects can be
detected during testing in a safe manner. Therefore, the probability of electrical failure causing a
dangerous situation is considered remote.

Physical
Mitigation

The boards will be designed in such a way that the pressure transducers receive the power levels
they need to accurately record the tank pressure.

Procedural
Mitigation

In order to prevent a possible hazard, the electronics connected to the pressure transducers will be
thoroughly tested prior to charging the tank. Any and all defects or discrepancies will be recorded
and reported to the proper authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-027
Hazard Name PtML02 Burst

Final RAC

3

Part Name

PtML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

For the pressure transducer to burst, the material (stainless steel) of the outer casing would have to
yield. Over pressurization could trigger material yield.

Consequences

A rupture of the first pressure transducer would release most of the stored propellant and therefore
ruin any chance of mission success. Also, such a release of energy could cause damage to nearby
equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.

Probability

The pressure transducers (both first and second) used for the MR SAT propulsion system are of a
type rated to pressures up to 10000 psig. However, due to the restrictions on tank pressure both
transducers were calibrated for a maximum pressure of 200 psi to give better precision to the
instrument. As this pressure transducer is after the regulator, it should experience only relatively
low pressures; therefore, the possibility of rupture is considered remote.

Physical
Mitigation

To entirely prevent this hazard from occurring, a new pressure transducer rated to a pressure
greater than the tank pressure is required. However, as currently designed the probability of hazard
occurrence is such than no physical mitigation is necessary.

Procedural
Mitigation

The safety of this device depends on the operation of the pressure regulation device. Therefore,
system testing is imperative. Any and all deviations with system components will be reported to the
proper authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-028
Hazard Name VML02 stuck closed

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The most likely cause for an isolation valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical
problem preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the
24 volt pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Consequences

With the second isolation valve stuck in the closed position, formation flight is unachievable.
However, there is not a potential risk of injury or further equipment damage associated with this
failure mode.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-029
Hazard Name VML02 Locked Open

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

With the valve stuck in the open position, the second of the three system inhibits is lost. This is not
directly detrimental to mission objectives as the first isolation valve maintains tank isolation, and the
second isolation valve is to remain open throughout the period of formation flight anyway.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to achieve nominal operation will
be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-030
Hazard Name VML02 Clogged

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the isolation valves are extremely narrow and easily clogged with foreign
material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the construction process such
as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve is likely to be a
frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-031
Hazard Name VML02 Burst

Final RAC

3

Part Name

VML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

For the isolation valve to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its
yield pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

Consequences

A rupture of the second isolation valve would prevent propellant from reaching the thruster
assemblies, and thus end the formation flight portion of the mission. Also, such a release of energy
could cause damage to nearby equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-032
Hazard Name VML02 leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the second isolation valve is improper
tightening of the Swagelok connections.

A leak in the second isolation valve would not immediately cause a loss of propellant (assuming the
first isolation valve is functioning properly). However, once formation flight operations begin, the
leaking propellant would limit the duration of the formation flight mission phase.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-033
Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Final RAC

4

Part Name

VML02

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-034
Hazard Name Swagelok Cross (CML01) Leak

Final RAC

4

Part Name

CML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

Consequences

A leak stemming from the Swagelok cross would cause a loss of propellant during the formation
flight phase of the mission. Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission
goals may not be met. There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should
prevent propellant from reaching the cross fitting except during controlled testing of the system.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-035
Hazard Name Swagelok Cross (CML01) Rupture

Final RAC

3

Part Name

CML01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations. A rupture could also cause damage
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-036

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL101 leak

4
TL101

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL101 would cause a loss of propellant during the formation
flight phase of the mission. Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission
goals may not be met. There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should
prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-037

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL101 Rupture

3
TL101

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations. A rupture could also cause damage
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-038

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL201 leak

4
TL201

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL201 would cause a loss of propellant during the formation
flight phase of the mission. Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission
goals may not be met. There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should
prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-039

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL201 Rupture

3
TL201

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations. A rupture could also cause damage
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

144

Hazard NumberProp-040

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL301 leak

4
TL301

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL301 would cause a loss of propellant during the formation
flight phase of the mission. Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission
goals may not be met. There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should
prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-041

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL301 Rupture

3
TL301

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations. A rupture could also cause damage
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-042

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL2a01 leak

4
TL2a01

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

Consequences

A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL2a01 would cause a loss of propellant during the
formation flight phase of the mission. Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and
mission goals may not be met. There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves
should prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-043

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL2a01 Rupture

3
TL2a01

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations. A rupture could also cause damage
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-044

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL2b01 leak

4
TL2b01

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point. This
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.

Consequences

A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL2b01 would cause a loss of propellant during the
formation flight phase of the mission. Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and
mission goals may not be met. There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves
should prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-045

Final RAC

Hazard Name TL2b01 Rupture

3
TL2b01

Part Name

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization

A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations. A rupture could also cause damage
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.

Probability

The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system. Therefore, it should
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting. Even if
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the
propellant tank. (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and
propellant loss is remote.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-046

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr05 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr05 (TrL1a01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr05 is responsible for providing counterclockwise rotation around the x axis of the satellite
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4). With this thruster stuck in the closed position,
rotation maneuvers around the x axis would be limited to the clockwise direction which could
negatively impact formation flight goals. Also, translational maneuvers in the positive y direction
would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-047

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr05 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr05 (TrL1a01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control. During testing, this failure
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-048

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr05 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr05 (TrL1a01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-049

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr05 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr05 (TrL1a01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr05 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-050

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr05 leak

Part Name

4
Tr05 (TrL1a01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr05 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-051

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr05 (TrL1a01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

156

Hazard NumberProp-052

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr06 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr06 (TrL1b01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr06 is responsible for providing clockwise rotation around the x axis of the satellite
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4). With this thruster stuck in the closed position,
rotation maneuvers around the x axis would be limited to the counterclockwise direction which
could negatively impact formation flight goals. Also, translational maneuvers in the positive y
direction would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

157

Hazard NumberProp-053

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr06 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr06 (TrL1b01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control. During testing, this failure
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

158

Hazard NumberProp-054

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr06 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr06 (TrL1b01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

159

Hazard NumberProp-055

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr06 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr06 (TrL1b01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr06 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

160

Hazard NumberProp-056

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr06 leak

Part Name

4
Tr06 (TrL1b01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr06 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

161

Hazard NumberProp-057

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr06 (TrL1b01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

162

Hazard NumberProp-058

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr01 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr01 (TrL2a101)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr01 is responsible for providing clockwise rotation around the y axis of the satellite
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4). With this thruster stuck in the closed position,
rotation maneuvers around the y axis would be limited to the counterclockwise direction which
could negatively impact formation flight goals. Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x
direction would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

163

Hazard NumberProp-059

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr01 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr01 (TrL2a101)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control. During testing, this failure
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

164

Hazard NumberProp-060

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr01 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr01 (TrL2a101)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

165

Hazard NumberProp-061

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr01 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr01 (TrL2a101)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr01 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

166

Hazard NumberProp-062

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr01 leak

Part Name

4
Tr01 (TrL2a101)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr01 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-063

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr01 (TrL2a1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

168

Hazard NumberProp-064

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr02 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr02 (TrL2a2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr02 is responsible for providing counterclockwise rotation around the z axis of the satellite
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4). With this thruster stuck in the closed position,
rotation maneuvers around the z axis would be limited to the clockwise direction which could
negatively impact formation flight goals. Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x direction
would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-065

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr02 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr02 (TrL2a2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control. During testing, this failure
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

170

Hazard NumberProp-066

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr02 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr02 (TrL2a2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

171

Hazard NumberProp-067

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr02 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr02 (TrL2a2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr02 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

172

Hazard NumberProp-068

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr02 leak

Part Name

4
Tr02 (TrL2a2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr02 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

173

Hazard NumberProp-069

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr02 (TrL2a2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

174

Hazard NumberProp-070

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr03 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr03 is responsible for providing clockwise rotation around the z axis of the satellite
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4). With this thruster stuck in the closed position,
rotation maneuvers around the z axis would be limited to the counterclockwise direction which
could negatively impact formation flight goals. Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x
direction would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

175

Hazard NumberProp-071

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr03 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control. During testing, this failure
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

176

Hazard NumberProp-072

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr03 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

177

Hazard NumberProp-073

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr03 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr03 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

178

Hazard NumberProp-074

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr03 leak

Part Name

4
Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr03 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

179

Hazard NumberProp-075

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

180

Hazard NumberProp-076

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr04 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr04 is responsible for providing counterclockwise rotation around the y axis of the satellite
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4). With this thruster stuck in the closed position,
rotation maneuvers around the y axis would be limited to the clockwise direction which could
negatively impact formation flight goals. Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x direction
would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

181

Hazard NumberProp-077

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr04 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control. During testing, this failure
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

182

Hazard NumberProp-078

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr04 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

183

Hazard NumberProp-079

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr04 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr04 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

184

Hazard NumberProp-080

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr04 leak

Part Name

4
Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr04 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

185

Hazard NumberProp-081

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

186

Hazard NumberProp-082

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr07 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr07 (TrL3a-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr07 is responsible for providing the counter force necessary to prevent translational motion during
rotation maneuvers around the x axis (positive x axis directed through panel 4) and translational
maneuverability in the negative y direction. With Tr07 stuck closed, the translational force would not be able
to be canceled out and the satellite would deviate from the formation. Additionally, translational maneuvers
in the negative y direction would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing
personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

187

Hazard NumberProp-083

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr07 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr07 (TrL3a-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

Consequences

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to translate unexpectedly along the negative y axis.
During testing, this failure mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly
greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

188

Hazard NumberProp-084

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr07 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr07 (TrL3a-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

189

Hazard NumberProp-085

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr07 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr07 (TrL3a-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr07 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

190

Hazard NumberProp-086

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr07 leak

Part Name

4
Tr07 (TrL3a-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr07 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

191

Hazard NumberProp-087

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr07 (TrL3a-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-088

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr08 stuck closed

Part Name

4
Tr08 (TrL3b-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem
preventing the opening of the valve. This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.

Thruster Tr08 is responsible for providing the counter force necessary to prevent translational motion during
rotation maneuvers around the y and z axes (positive x axis directed through panel 4) and translational
maneuverability in the negative x direction. With Tr08 stuck closed, the translational force would not be able
to be canceled out and the satellite would deviate from the formation. Additionally, translational maneuvers
in the negative x direction would be impaired. This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing
personnel.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

Change out non working valves.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-089

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr08 Locked Open

Part Name

4
Tr08 (TrL3b-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not
continually supplied to the solenoid. Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open
position is a defective part.

Consequences

The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation
valves. The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to translate unexpectedly along the negative x axis.
During testing, this failure mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly
greater than expected.

Probability

Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve
will be stuck in the open position.

Physical
Mitigation

All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted. All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure. Any deviations
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities. All valves failing to
achieve nominal operation will be replace.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4

194

Hazard NumberProp-090

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr08 Clogged

Part Name

4
Tr08 (TrL3b-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Frequent

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines. (Left over material from the
construction process such as metallic shavings)

Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and
lock the valve in either the open or closed position. Foreign material lodged within the nozzle
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.

Probability

Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within
the propellant lines can not be discounted. Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is
likely to be a frequent occurrence.

Physical
Mitigation

Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.

Procedural
Mitigation

Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system. This
should limit the remaining debris.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Negligible

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-091

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr08 Burst

Part Name

3
Tr08 (TrL3b-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield
pressure. Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to
rupture.

If Thruster Tr08 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and
trigger a safe mode within the satellite. Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy. Should the burst
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant
and increase the risk of exposure.

Probability

Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety
associated with the valve. The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11. For the 307 psi setting, the
FOS is still a respectable 3.66. Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission. The valve is rated to 70 C
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures
greater than 100 C.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-092

Final RAC

Hazard Name Tr08 leak

Part Name

4
Tr08 (TrL3b-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Occasional

RAC

4

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr07 is improper tightening of
the Swagelok connection.

A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was
activated and formation flight implemented. At that point the leak would cause propellant loss
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight. Additionally, the loss of
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder
propulsive maneuvers.

Probability

When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account. If procedures are not
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous
situations can occur.

Physical
Mitigation

No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.

Procedural
Mitigation

The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer
tightening procedures are followed. Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point. Each step of the
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be
reported to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-093

Final RAC

Hazard Name Voltage step-down malfunction

Part Name

4
Tr08 (TrL3b-01)

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board. The most obvious
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.

The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open. The voltage is
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state. If the step-down process does not occur
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over
heat and possibly rupture.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of
the propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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Hazard NumberProp-094

Final RAC

Hazard Name SS Tubing Burst

Part Name

3
Variable Prop Lines

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

For the MR SAT propellant lines to burst, the stainless steal material would have to be stressed past
its yield point by the pressure within the lines.

Consequences

A rupture of the propellant lines would cause the release of propellant in an undirected manner. As
a consequence, the satellite mission likely would end in failure. During testing, rupture could lead
to flying debris and possible injury to testing personnel or harm to surrounding equipment.

Probability

Propellant line rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of
safety associated with the valve. The stainless steel lines are rated to 10000 psi; therefore at the
100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 100. For the 307 psi setting, the FOS is still a respectable
32.57.

Physical
Mitigation

Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.

Procedural
Mitigation

Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly. Each step
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly. All deviations and problems will be reported to the
appropriate authorities. Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-095
Hazard Name Tank Heater (HTk01) Stuck On

Final RAC

3

Part Name

HTk01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

2

Hazard Analysis

Causes

Consequences

The tank heater stuck in the on position could be caused by either an electrical malfunction or an
error within the control code.

The tank heater stuck in the on position could have several possible consequences. The first is the
over heating of the propellant which could lead to over pressurization of the tank. Second, the
heater itself could be damaged, limiting the systems response to temperature loss and inhibiting the
phase change of the propellant.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the heaters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
heaters integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Critical

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

3
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Hazard NumberProp-096
Hazard Name Tank Heater (HTk01) Non-Functioning

Final RAC

4

Part Name

HTk01

Pre-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

Marginal

Probability
Classification Probable

RAC

3

Hazard Analysis

Causes

The tank heater failing to turn on could be caused by either an electrical malfunction or an error
within the control code.

Consequences

While propellant freezing is not a major concern given the temperature range expected for the
mission, low propellant temperature within the storage tank would prevent the necessary phase
change from occurring and thus severely limit system performance.

Probability

The design of the electrical boards which control the heaters are not under the control of the
propulsion subsystem. However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the
system. Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is
currently rated as probable.

Physical
Mitigation

A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to
remote.

Procedural
Mitigation

Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary. Such testing will begin with
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and
heaters integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration. Any deviations from nominal operation will be
recorded and reported to the proper authorities. Electrical problems documented in the testing
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.

Prost-mitigation Classification

Severity
Classification

marginal

Probability
Classification Remote

RAC

4
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